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CIVIL RULE 54(B): SEVENTY-FIVE AND READY FOR
RETIREMENT
Andrew S. Pollis∗
Abstract
As we commemorate the diamond anniversary of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, this Article takes a critical look at one of the failed
Rules: Rule 54(b). Although many commentators have noted difficulties
with Rule 54(b), this is the first effort to describe those difficulties
comprehensively, analyze their root causes, and offer a workable
alternative.
When an order resolves a discrete claim in a multi-claim action, Rule
54(b) permits a district court to sever the order for immediate appeal by
“expressly determin[ing] that there is no just reason for delay.” The rule
was designed to ease the hardship on litigants who would otherwise
have to await the conclusion of the entire case to appeal an adverse
ruling.
But the Rule has spawned seventy-five years of chaos. Appellate
courts, in examining their jurisdiction to review an order certified under
Rule 54(b), struggle to evaluate whether the order fully adjudicates a
discrete and severable claim. They struggle to evaluate what “no just
reason for delay” really means. And they struggle to articulate
consistent standards for district courts to follow in making the required
“express determin[ation].” At the heart of the problem lies a power
clash: Rule 54(b) puts the district court in charge of deciding when an
appellate court is required to hear an appeal. Not surprisingly, appellate
courts often resist. And the resistance often comes only after full
briefing and oral argument.
It is time to end the struggle. And a better solution exists. This
Article advocates the repeal of Rule 54(b) and, in its place, a resort to a
discretionary-appeal system to permit trial courts to certify certain
orders for immediate appeal and to permit appellate courts to decide
whether to hear them.

∗ Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to my
colleagues Jessie Hill, Sharona Hoffman, David Mills, and Cassandra Burke Robertson for their
valuable comments on this Article and general support; to Glen Staszewski for excellent
comments and for including me in the junior-faculty exchange at Michigan State University
College of Law; and to Steve Sheppard and the faculty at the University of Arkansas School of
Law for their generous hospitality and feedback. Deep gratitude to Kevin Clermont and Michael
Solimine for providing comments and criticism that crystallized some of the important issues I
address and inspired me to articulate them better.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2004, Planned Parenthood sued the State of Ohio,
challenging the constitutionality of a statute limiting access to RU-486,
the early-abortion pill.1 Seven years later, the district court, on summary
judgment, rejected all but one of Planned Parenthood’s constitutional
challenges.2 The court then certified the decision for immediate appeal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),3 which permits a district
court to enter partial final judgment on fewer than all claims in a multiclaim action if the court finds “no just reason for delay.”4 Planned
1. See Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 493–94 (6th Cir.
2012).
2. Id. at 499.
3. Id. This Article frequently uses the words “certify” and “certification” when referring
to a partial final judgment entered under Rule 54(b). Some courts criticize the use of that
nomenclature. See, e.g., James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1067 n.6 (9th Cir.
2002) (term “certification” is a “misnomer born of confusion between Rule 54(b) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), only the latter of which requires a certification”). I disagree with that criticism for
two reasons. First, the rule does contain a certification requirement, even if the language of the
rule does not use that word. See infra text accompanying notes 99–101. Second, the Supreme
Court itself has adopted that nomenclature. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436
(1956) (holding that district court had not “abused its discretion in certifying that there exists no
just reason for delay” under Rule 54(b)). As this Article demonstrates, imprecise use of
“certification” is trivial compared with the other problems with the Rule.
4. The current version of the rule, entitled “Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving
Multiple Parties,” provides:
JUDGMENT ON MULTIPLE CLAIMS OR INVOLVING MULTIPLE PARTIES. When
an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there
is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities
of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or
parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
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Parenthood appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
and in June 2012, the appellate court held oral argument. After eight
years of litigation, the parties expected a decision on the important
constitutional questions, never before decided by a federal appellate
court, that would determine the extent of Ohio citizens’ access to RU486.
But two days before the oral argument, in a letter to counsel, the
Sixth Circuit raised an entirely different concern: whether the district
court had “properly certified” its decision as final under Rule 54(b).5 If
the certification was improper, then the Sixth Circuit had no jurisdiction
and would dismiss the case. Jurisdiction played a dominant role in the
oral argument, and the court requested additional post-argument
briefing on the issue.6
Though recognizing that its decision was not “straightforward,” the
Sixth Circuit ultimately acquiesced to the Rule 54(b) certification and
ruled on the merits of the appeal.7 Nevertheless, the court’s eleventhhour concern about its jurisdiction under Rule 54(b) is symptomatic of a
larger problem that has plagued courts since the first iteration of the
Rule in 19388: no one is entirely sure what it means. The Rule was
designed to permit district courts to enter partial final judgment on
discrete claims in multi-claim or multi-party litigation, even before the
case is adjudicated in its entirety, if the district court concludes in its
discretion that immediate appeal is warranted. But courts struggle to
understand what constitutes a “claim” under the rule. They struggle to
determine if a resolved claim is sufficiently distinct from those that
remain for adjudication. And they struggle to articulate what, and how
much, the Rule requires district judges to articulate in exercising their
discretion to certify. The circuits disagree about the legal standards, and
judges apply those standards unevenly.
To some extent the problem lies in the Rule’s resort to an awkward
blend of legal doctrine (what constitutes a discrete claim?) and trialcourt discretion (what are the circumstances justifying a finding of “no
just reason for delay”?). To make matters worse, the two inquiries
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
5. Letter from Leonard Green, Clerk of U.S. Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit, to
Counsel, Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. DeWine, No. 11-4062 (6th Cir. June 5,
2012).
6. Planned Parenthood, 696 F.3d at 500.
7. Id.
8. “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by the Supreme Court on
December 27, 1937, and became effective in September 1938.” William V. Dorsaneo III & C.
Paul Rogers III, The Flawed Nexus Between Contract Law and the Rules of Procedure: Why
Rules 8 And 9 Must Be Changed, 31 REV. LITIG. 233, 239 n.18 (2012).
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involve overlapping considerations. Not surprisingly, then, appellate
courts often collapse the two inquiries when reviewing the propriety of
a district court’s Rule 54(b) certification, lending further uncertainty to
the Rule 54(b) standards.
The Rule also has a feature unique in appellate jurisdiction—it
permits district courts to use their discretion in determining whether
appellate courts must hear a case. Some appellate courts resist that odd
allocation of power. Conversely, some ignore the jurisdictional issue
and defer entirely to the district court’s decision to certify. Of course,
neither approach is satisfactory; the uncertain standards and inconsistent
treatment leave litigants confused about their appeal rights and burden
appellate courts with jurisdictional clutter on their already-overcrowded
dockets. And often, as in the Planned Parenthood case, these issues
surface only after the parties have expended time and resources briefing
the case and preparing for oral argument. Despite the best intentions, it
is hardly the “simple, definite, workable rule” that its drafters hoped it
would be.9
Perhaps what is most astonishing about this problem is that it has
persisted for seventy-five years, creating decades of jurisdictional
uncertainty. Courts and commentators have noted that the problem has
existed since the outset.10 And it continues. Planned Parenthood is but
one example; a recent Third Circuit opinion observed that “numerous
cases discuss[] the rule,” but it remains “not understood clearly
and . . . sometimes misapplied.”11 Despite the discontent, the Supreme
Court has never adequately addressed the problem; it has decided only a
handful of Rule 54(b) cases, all more than thirty years ago.12 And rather
than dispel the confusion, the few relevant Supreme Court cases have

9. See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
72 (1946) [hereinafter 1946 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts
.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV06-1946.pdf.
10. E.g., Craig E. Stewart, Case Note, Multiple Claims Under Rule 54(b): A Time for
Reexamination?, 1985 BYU L. REV. 327, 327 (“Since its adoption, [Rule] 54(b) has posed
definitional problems.”).
11. Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 228 (3d Cir. 2012).
12. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980); Seatrain Shipbuilding
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 583–84 (1980); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S.
737 (1976); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956); Cold Metal Process Co. v.
United Eng’g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445 (1956); Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283 (1942).
See also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 556 (2005) (discussed infra at
note 215).
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actually exacerbated it.13 In one case, the Court squarely refused to
“attempt” to resolve some of the confusion.14
But the uncertainty and confusion are entirely unnecessary. As this
Article explains, after seventy-five years it is now clear that we do not
need the Rule. We have a mechanism for discretionary appellate review
that is already well known to district and appellate courts—certification
for appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Resort to the wellunderstood statutory mechanism would remove all of the uncertainty
and confusion surrounding the application of Rule 54(b), while still
achieving the Rule’s ostensible purpose.
This Article begins by laying out that ostensible purpose. Part I
explains the rationale behind the original adoption of Rule 54(b) in
1938, as well as the issues that have informed the occasional
amendments to the rule over the years. The Rule sprang from a concern
that the adoption of the Civil Rules in 1938 would increase the
complexity of civil lawsuits and, as a result, delay the entry of final
judgment and access to appellate review. Subsequent amendments
helped clarify some areas of confusion, in particular confusion over the
method for ensuring a district court’s intention to invoke the Rule and
its applicability to cases involving not only multiple claims, but also
multiple parties.
But, as Part II explains, the changes failed to clarify the mostfundamental problem with the Rule: how to determine whether a civil
action actually involves multiple claims and, if so, whether a particular
interlocutory order completely resolves at least one of them. The 1948
amendment to the Rule also added a discretionary step that the district
court must take in order to apply the Rule, and that step has added a
further layer of confusion.
Part III explains that we have no reason to cling to this broken
system, because we simply do not need the Rule. Section 1292(b)
already provides for discretionary appellate review, and its provisions
can be adapted to situations that would warrant partial final judgment
under Rule 54(b). Unlike the Rule, the statute poses few interpretive
problems and largely turns on the trial and appellate courts’ exercise of
discretion. The statutory approach is by no means perfect; as I have
argued elsewhere, in certain circumstances it vests too much discretion
in both trial and appellate courts and therefore fails to provide a
meaningful antidote to serious trial-court error that occurs before final
13. See, e.g., Douglas D. McFarland, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: The Transaction or
Occurrence and the Claim Interlock Civil Procedure, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 247, 293 (2011)
(arguing that Sears is “a bad decision, one of the worst in the history of the Court”).
14. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 424 U.S. at 743 n.4 (“We need not here attempt any
definitive resolution of the meaning of what constitutes a claim for relief within the meaning of
the Rules.”).
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judgment.15 It also imposes administrative burdens. But these and other
drawbacks of the statute are a small price to pay to alleviate the
uncertainty and confusion that afflict the finality inquiry under Rule
54(b) and the delay or even loss of substantive appellate review that can
result. Thus, as we celebrate the diamond anniversary of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, it is time to excise from them the troublesome
Rule 54(b).
Prior commentators have recognized that Rule 54(b) is
problematic,16 but none to date has provided a comprehensive
explanation of its difficulties or proposed a viable alternative, as I do
here.17 If my solution were in place today, the Sixth Circuit’s only
concern in Planned Parenthood would have been the merits of the
important constitutional issues in the case.
I. THE PURPOSE OF RULE 54(B) AND ITS AMENDMENTS
An understanding of the problems with Rule 54(b) begins with an
exploration of its origins, which in turn requires context. As this Part
explains, the first iteration of the rule, in 1938, appeared in the midst of
a century-long debate over the finality rule and its exceptions. Against
that backdrop, it was hardly surprising that the original Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure included Rule 54(b) in response to a concern about the
ways in which the new Rules expanded civil litigation and potentially
delayed finality. This Part also explains the two significant amendments
to the Rule—amendments that reflected changing perceptions about the
need for finality and that began to acknowledge some of the confusion
engendered by the original Rule.
A. The Context for Rule 54(b): The Longstanding Debate over the
Contours of the Finality Rule
The story of Rule 54(b) is but one chapter in a long saga about the
proper scope of appellate jurisdiction. That debate starts from a premise
15. See Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review
in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1662–63 (2011).
16. See, e.g., 10 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 54.22[2][b]
(3d ed. 2012); 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2657
(3d ed. 1998); McFarland, supra note 13, at 288–301; Note, Appealability in the Federal
Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 357–63 (1961); John B. Rees, Jr., Note, Federal Rule 54(b): The
Multiple Claims Requirement, 43 VA. L. REV. 229, 229 (1957); Jacqueline Gerson, Comment,
The Appealability of Partial Judgments in Consolidated Cases, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 169, 175
(1990); Stewart, supra note 10, at 327, 332.
17. Professor Kevin Clermont has advocated expanding Rule 54(b) to avoid its
definitional problems, suggesting that trial judges should have wide discretion to determine
when the balance of interests favors immediate appeal. See, e.g., KEVIN M. CLERMONT,
PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 148–49 (3d ed. 2012). As I explain below, I respectfully
disagree with that proposal. See infra text accompanying notes 346–48.
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that an appeal may not proceed “in fragments.”18 Thus, the finaljudgment rule, currently codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1291,19 confers
appellate jurisdiction over trial-court orders that “end[] the litigation on
the merits and leave[] nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.”20 The final-judgment rule is “[o]ne of the bedrock principles
of appellate court jurisdiction.”21
But courts have frequently chipped away at this bedrock principle.
By 1892, finality was already the subject of “frequent discussion” in the
case law.22 In 1949, the Supreme Court expanded the definition of
finality by announcing the infamous collateral-order doctrine.23 And in
1964, the Court noted that “it is impossible to devise a formula to
resolve all marginal cases coming within what might well be called the
‘twilight zone’ of finality.”24
Congress and the Supreme Court have also eroded the finality rule
through statutory or rule-based exceptions beginning in 1891, with a
statutory right of limited interlocutory appeal.25 In the 120 years since
then, numerous exceptions, beyond Rule 54(b), have expanded the
scope of appellate jurisdiction.26 These exceptions include various
interlocutory orders that are subject to appeal as of right27 and others
that are appealable in the discretion of the courts.28 These various
18. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1920).
19. “The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts of the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
20. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
21. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 43 F.3d 912, 918 (4th Cir. 1995).
22. McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 545 (1892).
23. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (holding that orders
are final if they are “collateral to” the merits of an action and “too important to be denied
[immediate] review”). Although some would argue that the collateral-order doctrine operates as
an exception to the finality rule, the Court has taken pains to explain that it is “best understood
not as an exception to the ‘final decision’ rule . . ., but as a ‘practical construction’ of it.” Digital
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994) (referencing Cohen, 337 U.S. at
546).
24. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964).
25. Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 7, 26 Stat. 826, 828 (1891)
(permitting appeal from an “interlocutory order or decree granting or continuing [an]
injunction”) (current version found in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006)).
26. E.g., Pollis, supra note 15, at 1652–59.
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2006) (providing for appeals from certain orders involving
preliminary injunctions, receiverships, and the parties’ rights in admiralty cases); see also 9
U.S.C. § 16(a) (2006) (providing for appeals from orders denying motions to enforce contractual
arbitration clauses).
28. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (providing for discretionary appeals from orders granting or
denying class certification); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (establishing a mechanism for district
courts to certify certain orders relating to dispositive issues of law for discretionary appeal); 28
U.S.C. § 1453(c) (2006) (permitting discretionary appeals of orders granting or denying remand
of class actions removed from state to federal court).
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avenues for appeal have inspired commentators to lament the resulting
labyrinth of doctrine, rules, and statutes.29
The labyrinth is the product of a struggle to strike a proper balance
in conferring the right of appeal.30 On the one hand, we strive to provide
adequate opportunities for appellate review from orders that are not
final judgments if they have a “serious, perhaps irreparable,
consequence” that demands immediate appellate review.31 On the other
hand, “[d]isfavoring piecemeal appeals is a long-standing policy of the
federal courts”;32 we want to withhold the right of appeal “when the
competing considerations of judicial economy,” such as the burden on
the appellate courts and the delay of proceedings in the trial courts,
“outweigh the need for immediate review.”33 That tension underlies any
debate about expanding appellate jurisdiction beyond the final-judgment
rule,34 and it certainly has found its way into the debacle that is Rule
54(b).35
B. The Emergence and Evolution of Rule 54(b)
There are three pivotal moments in the history of Rule 54(b): the
initial promulgation of the Rule in 1938 and two substantive
amendments, in 1948 and in 1961.36 This Section discusses each in turn.
1. The Original 1938 Rule: Antidote to the Expanded Civil Action
It is not difficult to understand the dynamics that led to the
promulgation of Rule 54(b) in 1938. Rule 54(b) was the antidote to the
expansion of the civil action occasioned by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.37
29. E.g., Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237,
1238–39 (2007) (observing that “[t]he current system has been subject to much criticism” and
collecting pejorative statements from other commentators).
30. See Pollis, supra note 15, at 1649–50; see also Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion
Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
31. See Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955); see also Pollis,
supra note 15, at 1647.
32. E.g., Sussex Drug Prods. v. Kanasco, Ltd., 920 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1990).
33. E.g., Pollis, supra note 15, at 1654; see also Dickinson, 338 U.S. at 511 (noting the
“struggle of the courts; sometimes to devise a formula that will encompass all situations and at
other times to take hardship cases out from under the rigidity of previous declarations”).
34. Pollis, supra note 15, at 1649.
35. That tension also informs my proposed solution to the Rule 54(b) problem, addressed
in Part III.
36. There also were style amendments to Rule 54(b) in 2007, as part of a comprehensive
redrafting of the Rules, which did not purport to impact any of the substantive provisions. See
infra note 77.
37. See Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, supra note 16, at 357–58; see also SEC
v. Capital Consultants LLC, 453 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Before the Federal Rules, the final-judgment rule required that a
judgment terminate a case “not only as to all the parties, but as to the
whole subject-matter and as to all the causes of action involved.”38
“[T]here was no authority for treating anything less than the whole case
as a judicial unit for purposes of appeal.”39 But there also was no need
for a narrower characterization of the judicial unit; the common-law
system that predated the Rules permitted only “single issue pleading,”40
“reduc[ing] each lawsuit to a single issue of law or fact.”41 Commonlaw rules also “severely restrict[ed] the joinder of plaintiffs and
defendants.”42 As a result, a case was typically concluded—and ripe for
appeal—once the district court adjudicated the single issue raised in the
pleadings.43
The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated that
simplicity, replacing it with “a liberal pleading regime that provided for
increased joinder of claims and parties.”44 Plaintiffs could now bring all
their claims against the same defendant in a single action, whether or
not the claims were connected to each other,45 and plaintiffs could also
name multiple defendants in the same action.46 Defendants could now
assert both related and unrelated counterclaims against plaintiffs,47
assert cross-claims against each other,48 and even bring third parties into
the lawsuit.49 This new liberal regime “promised to increase greatly the
length and complexity of many lawsuits.”50
It was precisely that increased length and complexity that prompted
the perceived need for a tempering antidote.51 The rule drafters worried
38. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1920); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 431 (1956) (before modern civil procedure rules, the presence of
unresolved claims “was generally regarded as leaving the appellate court without jurisdiction of
an attempted appeal”).
39. Sears, 351 U.S. at 432.
40. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914 (1987).
41. Gerson, supra note 16, at 174; see also John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil
Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 555–56 (2012) (footnote omitted) (“The pleading
rules at common law, especially the single-issue requirement, greatly restricted multiparty and
multi-issue litigation.”).
42. Subrin, supra note 40, at 916.
43. See, e.g., Sears, 351 U.S. at 431–32.
44. Gerson, supra note 16, at 174.
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 18.
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 20.
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g).
48. Id.
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 14.
50. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, supra note 16, at 357–58; see also Ind.
Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1443 (7th Cir. 1988) (“drafters
recognized that the liberal joinder rules . . . would lead to more complex lawsuits ”).
51. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432 (1956) (“[I]ncreased
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that the larger judicial unit, no longer involving just a single issue, had
the potential to delay finality, at least under the traditional definition
that required resolution of the entire action.52 But “some claims within
an action would become ripe for review before resolution of the entire
action.”53 The resulting delay had the potential to create “the danger of
hardship and denial of justice.”54 The amendments thus created a
disparity between the contours of a civil lawsuit and boundaries of the
traditional finality rule.55
Enter Rule 54(b). The Rule was designed to divide this new, large
lawsuit back into smaller units of disposition, comprised of individual
claims, once the trial court resolved one or more discrete claims.56 In
those cases, if the court adjudicated “the issues material to a particular
claim” and all related counterclaims, it could “enter a judgment
disposing of such claim,” which would “terminate the action with
respect to the claim so disposed of.”57 These smaller subunits would
look more like the common-law action and, thus, would permit the
appellate courts to continue to apply the familiar “standard of finality,”
even under the expanded civil-litigation system.58 Thus, “[R]ule 54(b)
merely modified the ‘judicial unit’ to which the concept of finality
applied”59 while leaving “unimpaired the statutory concept of finality

opportunity for the liberal joinder of claims in multiple claim actions . . . demonstrated a need
for relaxing the restrictions upon what should be treated as a judicial unit for purposes of
appellate jurisdiction.”).
52. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511–12 (1950).
53. Gerson, supra note 16, at 174.
54. Dickinson, 338 U.S. at 511.
55. See Note, Finality of Judgments in Appeals from Federal District Courts, 49 YALE
L.J. 1476, 1477–78 (1940) (traditional final-judgment rule was “ill adapted to a procedural
system under which a suit may be a heterogeneous collection of claims, some of which are
alternative, some closely connected and some quite unrelated”).
56. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Consultants LLC, 453 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2006); see
also Gerson, supra note 16, at 174.
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (1938 version). The entirety of the original rule provided:
JUDGMENT AT VARIOUS STAGES. When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, the court at any stage, upon a determination of the issues
material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may enter a
judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with
respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the
remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is so entered, the court by order
may stay its enforcement until the entering of a subsequent judgment or
judgments and may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the
benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is entered.
58. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432 (1956).
59. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, supra note 16, at 359.
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prescribed by § 1291.”60
Like all constructions and exceptions to the traditional finality rule,
Rule 54(b) “reflect[ed] a balancing of two policies: avoiding the ‘danger
of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by
immediate appeal’ and ‘avoid[ing] piecemeal appeals.’”61 But the
balancing was skewed by the novelty of the new Civil Rules. It was the
“product” of the perceived danger of delay occasioned by the expansion
of the civil action.62 As a consequence, the original Rule erred on the
side of immediate appeal in all circumstances in which a district court
fully adjudicated a discrete claim in a multi-claim action.
2. The 1948 Amendment: A Quest for Greater Clarity and a Narrower
Application
The judicial system quickly grew accustomed to the more-complex
civil action,63 and the success of the transition began to assuage earlier
concerns about the frequency of hardship that would result from
delayed appeals. There was no longer a perceived need for an antidote
as strong as the original rule. And the Rule itself created confusion in its
application, because it was not always clear when the district court had
entered the now-permissible partial final judgment. Thus, within a
decade, the Rule would undergo an important amendment designed both
to limit and to clarify its use.
The confusion arose because it was not always clear when a district
court had entered a judgment that met the definition of the Rule—one
that constituted a “determination of the issues material to a particular
claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence
which [was] the subject matter of the claim.”64 And the consequence of
mistakenly concluding that the district court had not yet entered a Rule
54(b) judgment was severe given the time limit for appealing;65 “a party
who did not correctly divine that the court of appeals would regard a
60. Sears, 351 U.S. at 434.
61. Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 2000) (alteration in
original) (quoting PYCA Indus. v. Harrison Cnty. Waste Water Mgmt. Dist., 81 F.3d 1412,
1421 (5th Cir. 1996)); see also Marianne Fogarty, Note, The Finality of Partial Orders in
Consolidated Cases Under Rule 54(b), 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 647–48 (1989).
62. Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of
Litigants: What They Are, What They Might Be Part 1: Justiciability and Jurisdiction (Original
and Appellate), 42 UCLA L. REV. 717, 807–08 (1995); see also 1946 ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 9, at 70; Stewart, supra note 10, at 331.
63. Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
441, 450 (2010) (“Most heralded the 1938 Federal Rules as a great success, and more than half
of the states adopted rules modeled after them.”).
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (1938 version).
65. At the time, 28 U.S.C. § 340 (1940) generally provided a three-month period to appeal
from final orders of district courts.
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particular order as final under Rule 54(b) and who therefore waited until
the entire litigation ended to challenge the order would find that he had
forfeited his right to review.”66 As an example, the Supreme Court
dismissed an appeal in which the appellant waited until the conclusion
of the entire action to seek appellate review, rather than appeal as soon
as “its claims were dismissed.”67 Naturally, then, prudent lawyers did
what they tend to do—they appealed whenever the question of finality
was uncertain.68 Aggrieved litigants began to initiate appeals even
where “a trial remained to be had on other claims similar or identical
with those disposed of.”69
The Rule was therefore amended in 1948;70 indeed, it was rewritten
entirely and even given a new title: “Judgment upon Multiple Claims.”71
To remove all ambiguity about the existence of a partial final judgment
that triggered the running of the appeal clock, the amended Rule
provided that a district court “may direct the entry of a final judgment
upon one or more but less than all of the claims only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment.”72 Judge John Minor Wisdom
observed that “[t]he talismanic direction for the entry of judgment was
66. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, supra note 16, at 358; see also Local P171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065,
1072 (7th Cir. 1981) (“[L]itigants had no reliable way to determine whether a particular order
which determined fewer than all pending claims was final and appealable, and so were forced
either to file appeals from any order even arguably final or to risk losing the right to appeal it.”).
67. See, Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 513 (1950) (applying
pre-amendment version of Rule 54(b) and holding that Petroleum had forfeited its right to
appeal by not exercising that right at the time district court entered the relevant order). In that
case, the court had dismissed Petroleum’s claims but reserved supervisory jurisdiction to
supervise the distribution of stock shares and the allowance of further proceedings.
68. See Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, supra note 16, at 358.
69. 1946 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 71.
70. The amendment was promulgated on December 27, 1946, and made effective as of
March 19, 1948. See 329 U.S. 843, 861–62, 875 (1946).
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (1948 version); see also 328 U.S. 843, 861 (1946). The full text
of the amended rule provided:
JUDGMENT UPON MULTIPLE CLAIMS. When more than one claim for relief
is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or
more but less than all of the claims only upon an express determination that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the
claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims, and the order or
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims.
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (1948 version).
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added to serve as an unambiguous signal” that the time for appeal had
started to run.73 By contrast, if the district court chose not to articulate
either of the express requirements, the parties would know that the order
was not final and that they would not need to appeal prophylactically.74
The hope was that the amendment would, in Justice Hugo Black’s
words, “chart[] a clear route through the jungle.”75
The requirement that district-court judges affirmatively express their
intention to enter partial final judgment certainly avoided some of the
ambiguity of the prior Rule (although, as discussed below, it was not the
panacea the drafters hoped it would be).76 But that change reflected two
other important value judgments. First, the insertion of that requirement
into the Rule77—and the accompanying requirement that the district
court expressly determine that there is “no just reason for delay”—
reflected an important change in the thinking about the urgency of
appeal. No longer would parties automatically enjoy a right of appeal
from the adjudication of a claim that would have fit the smaller-unit
definition under the common law. Instead, the new Rule conferred on
district courts “[t]he function of . . . a ‘dispatcher.’”78 They were now
charged with exercising their “discretionary power” to determine which
adjudicated claims would qualify for partial final judgment and which
would not,79 with an admonition to confer that status sparingly—only in
“the infrequent harsh case.”80 Thus, within ten years of the original
adoption of Rule 54(b), the drafters came to believe that the expanded
civil-litigation system would not create “hardship and denial of justice
through delay” in every case involving multiple claims, as the Court had

73. Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Thompson Farms
Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir. 1981) (Wisdom, J.).
74. See, e.g., Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1952) (Hand, J.) (“[I]n a
case of ‘multiple claims’ the period of limitation upon the right of appeal does not begin to run
until the judge makes the required ‘determination’ . . . .”).
75. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 517 (1950) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 263–311.
77. The current version of the rule does not require “an express direction for the entry of
judgment.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). That language was deleted as part the comprehensive style
amendments promulgated in 2007. See 550 U.S. 1005, 1114–16 (2007); see also REPORT OF THE
RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SUBPART A, STYLE AMENDMENTS 147 (2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV06-2006.pdf. The deletion
of that language had no practical effect on the operation of the rule, which still requires the
district court “expressly [to] determine that there is no just reason for delay.” See FED. R. CIV.
P. 54(b).
78. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980) (quoting Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435 (1956)).
79. Stewart, supra note 10, at 344.
80. 1946 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 72.
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initially anticipated.81 Rather, the default appeared to be the opposite—
that litigants should be required to wait for the completion of the
litigation unless they demonstrated, to the district court’s satisfaction,
the requisite unusual hardship. A decade of experience had tempered the
initial concerns.
The second important value judgment reflected in the 1948
amendment involved allocation of judicial power and, in particular, the
power to decide—and even to create—appellate jurisdiction. As the
“dispatcher[s],”82 district-court judges in multi-claim cases now held the
keys to the appellate courthouse and enjoyed the discretion to decide
when to use those keys. One student commentator observed at the time
that this “grant of discretion” would be “the most controversial point in
the new rule” but argued that “the district court is the logical court” to
decide the wisdom of permitting an immediate appeal and lauded the
“uniformity of judicial administration expected under the new rule.”83
There was certainly logic in empowering the district court to serve as a
dispatcher, but the historic decision to do so taps into a fundamental
question in appellate jurisdiction: who should draw the line between
what is appealable and what is not?84 And, rather than categorically
determine that adjudications of discrete claims in multi-claim actions
were always appealable (as the original version of Rule 54(b) provided),
the 1948 amendment vested in district-court judges the power to make
that determination on a case-by-case basis.
Remarkably, the 1948 amendment conferred that power without
permitting the appellate court to have any say in the matter; a properly
certified Rule 54(b) judgment requires the appellate court to assume
jurisdiction.85 That allocation of power to the district court was
unprecedented at the time and remains unique; no other avenue of
discretionary appellate jurisdiction removes the appellate court from the
process of deciding whether to accept an appeal.86 The wisdom of that

81. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
82. See Sears, 351 U.S. at 435.
83. Note, Reformulation of the “Final Decision” Rule—Proposed Amendment to Rule
54(b), 56 YALE L.J. 141, 149 (1946) (footnotes omitted).
84. See Pollis, supra note 15, at 1651.
85. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (circuit courts “shall have jurisdiction” over final
orders); Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 583–84 (1980) (partial final
judgment under Rule 54(b) is “appealable” under § 1291).
86. See supra note 28 (listing sources of discretionary appellate jurisdiction). Of course, a
district court also enjoys discretion to make certain substantive decisions that give rise to an
appeal as of right. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006) (creating mandatory appellate
jurisdiction over orders relating to injunctions). But in those circumstances, the district court
exercises discretion in determining whether to grant the requested relief, not whether to permit
an immediate appeal.
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allocation of power is itself a topic of controversy.87 Wise or not, I
demonstrate below that appellate courts have responded inconsistently
to it;88 some appellate courts have gone to great lengths to interpret Rule
54(b) in ways that maximize their ability to second-guess the district
courts’ certification decisions.
3. The 1961 Amendment: Clarifying that the Rule Applies to MultiParty Litigation
In 1961, Rule 54(b) was again amended to clarify another point of
confusion over whether the rule applied to multi-party litigation—cases
in which the plaintiff had asserted an identical claim against multiple
defendants.89 Beginning in 1955, courts began to hold that the Rule did
apply in those circumstances.90 The “serious difficulty” created by the
disparate law on this point91 led to a 1961 amendment clarifying that it
applied to “one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties.”92
In explaining its reasoning, the advisory committee noted that “[t]he
danger of hardship through delay of appeal until the whole action is
concluded may be at least as serious in the multiple-parties situations as
in multiple-claims cases . . . .”93 The reference back to that “hardship”
language sounds at first blush like a retreat from the 1948 recognition
that an appeal at the conclusion of the entire litigation was normally
adequate and that certification under Rule 54(b) should be the
exception.94 But the 1961 amendment did not eliminate the district
court’s role as dispatcher—meaning that hardship still was not
presumed in every case.
II. SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF CONFUSION
The amendments in 1948 and 1961 focused on rectifying problems
that courts and parties had encountered in applying earlier versions of
87. See infra text accompanying notes 341–49.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 248–55, 273–77.
89. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 55
(1955), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV101955.pdf.
90. Benjamin Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961–63 (I),
77 HARV. L. REV. 601, 614 (1964).
91. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
CERTAIN RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 7 (1961)
[hereinafter 1961 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT].
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (1961 version) (emphasis added). The amendment was
promulgated on April 17, 1961, and made effective as of July 19, 1961. See 368 U.S. 1009
(1961).
93. 1961 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 91, at 6–7.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 80–81.
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Rule 54(b). It is surprising, then, that neither amendment addressed the
most-fundamental problem that has plagued the Rule since its earliest
days: the difficulty in determining “whether a particular order disposed
of a separate claim for relief.”95 And none of the post-1948 amendments
have addressed (or even recognized) the problems created by the
requirement that a district court expressly determine that there is “no
just reason for delay.”
This Part begins with a brief explanation of the ostensible mechanics
for applying Rule 54(b), which is critical to understanding its
limitations. I say “ostensible” because, as I go on to demonstrate, courts
and commentators uniformly agree that application of the Rule is
anything but mechanical. To the contrary, the Rule has created rampant
confusion for courts and litigants in determining appellate jurisdiction.
The last Section of this Part focuses specifically and thoroughly on the
aspects of the Rule that give rise to the chaos.
A. The Ostensible Mechanics of Rule 54(b)
The current version of Rule 54(b) permits district courts to “direct
entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or
parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason
for delay.”96 This deceptively simple language breaks down into two
basic components.
The first component is that the order in question must fully
adjudicate at least one claim or the rights and liabilities of at least one
party. As the Supreme Court has explained, there must be a “judgment,”
meaning “a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief,” and that
judgment “must be ‘final’ in the sense that it is ‘an ultimate disposition
of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims
action.’”97 Thus, for example, an order that determines liability but not
damages does not qualify for Rule 54(b) certification, because it does
not fully resolve a claim.98
The second component, added by the 1948 amendment, requires the
exercise of the district court’s discretion. If the order fully resolves at
least one claim, “the district court must go on to determine whether
there is any just reason for delay.”99 The Supreme Court, in keeping
with the spirit of the 1948 amendment, has cautioned that “[n]ot all final
judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable.”100
95. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, supra note 16, at 358.
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
97. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980) (quoting Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)).
98. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 745–46 (1976).
99. Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8.
100. See id. But, as explained further below, see infra text accompanying notes 271–72, the
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Thus, the “no just reason for delay” finding is the basis for
distinguishing between those orders that should be immediately
appealable and those that should not be. Drawing that distinction is
“[t]he function of the district court” in fulfilling its role as a
“dispatcher.”101
The second component is, at least in theory, distinct from the first in
an important respect. Determining whether an order fully resolves at
least one claim is—again, in theory—an objective exercise, while
deciding whether to certify an order for immediate appeal is a subjective
one, requiring “weighing and balancing the contending factors.”102 The
appellate court thus reviews de novo the district court’s threshold
objective determination that an adjudicated portion of an action
constitutes a separate and distinct claim for purposes of Rule 54(b).103
By contrast, as a consequence of the subjectivity of the second
component, the district court enjoys “substantial deference” in
determining whether there is no just reason for delay, and an appellate
court should reverse that determination only if it finds an abuse of
discretion.104 That oddly blended standard of review—no deference as
to the first component and wide deference as to the second—is one of
the root causes of the confusion that surrounds Rule 54(b).
B. The Rampant Confusion and Its Consequences
There is universal agreement that Rule 54(b) is problematic.
Commentators have previously lamented the “definitional problems”
that have plagued the Rule “[s]ince its adoption” seventy-five years
ago.105 But the confusion is not limited to definitional problems; courts
and commentators also misunderstand the dual standards of review that
appellate courts are required to use in reviewing a Rule 54(b)
certification.106 These and other problems have inspired courts to lament
Court did not embrace the advisory committee’s attempt to limit Rule 54(b) appeals. See
Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 10; see also supra text accompanying note 80.
101. Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8 (quoting Sears, 351 U.S. at 435).
102. Id. at 12; see also infra text accompanying notes 264–84.
103. Sears, 351 U.S. at 437 (“The District Court cannot, in the exercise of its discretion,
treat as ‘final’ that which is not ‘final’ within the meaning of § 1291.”); see also, e.g., Gen.
Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp, Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1027 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The determination that
a particular order ultimately disposes of a separable claim is a question of law reviewed de
novo . . . .”).
104. E.g., Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 12.
105. E.g., Stewart, supra note 10, at 327.
106. See, e.g., NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1992)
(determining that the severability of claims falls within “the zone of shadings traditionally
committed to a district judge’s discretion”); Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1070 (7th Cir. 1981) (appellate courts must
“rely on the sound discretion of district judges to” apply Rule 54(b) “on a case by case basis”);
Fogarty, supra note 61, at 649 (mistakenly suggesting that the district court “has the sole
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“that uncertainty is the rule”107 and that Rule 54(b) is “not understood
clearly.”108 The Third Circuit has even imposed on lawyers a heightened
obligation to assist courts in applying Rule 54(b).109
The difficulty with Rule 54(b) is particularly problematic because a
proper certification creates mandatory appellate jurisdiction,110 while
(by contrast) an improper certification gives rise to no right of appeal
and will result in dismissal of any appeal premised on it.111 When
litigants are uncertain about the propriety of a Rule 54(b) certification,
they either err on the side of appealing (aggravating congestion on the
appellate-court dockets), or they run the risk of losing the right to appeal
altogether by “sleep[ing] on their appeal rights.”112
Thus, our tolerance for jurisdictional uncertainty should be low.
Indeed, in a different context the Supreme Court has admonished courts
to avoid “[u]ncertainty regarding the question of jurisdiction,” calling
such uncertainty “particularly undesirable.”113 In the appellatejurisdiction context, the Court has recognized that it “has no authority to
create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.”114 The
Second Circuit, applying the original version of Rule 54(b), likewise
cautioned against loose standards and urged “a procedure uniform
throughout the country.”115 Commentators also agree on clarity in rules
of appellate jurisdiction: “[I]t is essential that [exceptions to the finaljudgment rule] be accurately mapped, that overlap among various
exceptions to the rule be minimized, and that those exceptions be
supported by strong principles so that their application to novel
situations is as orderly and predictable as possible.”116

discretion to determine the finality of the order”).
107. Sussex Drug Prods. v. Kanasco, Ltd., 920 F.2d 1150, 1154 (3d Cir. 1990).
108. Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 228 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Eldredge v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting “this unsettled area of the
law”).
109. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 431, 442 (3d Cir.
2003).
110. E.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 745–46 (1976).
111. Id.
112. Gerson, supra note 16, at 175; see also supra text accompanying notes 65–69.
113. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 582 (2004).
114. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 205–06 (2007).
115. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Indus. Corp., 154 F.2d 814, 817 (2d Cir.
1946). The Second Circuit recognized that “there may be times when a quick appellate decision
on a part of the case may be helpful . . . . But the policy [against piecemeal appeals] is the fruit
of experience and embodies a general judgment which is not to be cast aside for an occasional
aberrant case.” Id.
116. Aaron R. Petty, The Hidden Harmony of Appellate Jurisdiction, 62 S.C. L. REV. 353,
354 (2010). But see generally Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV.
971 (2009) (arguing that jurisdictional inflexibility is a falsehood).

730

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

But seventy-five years of confusion over Rule 54(b) have lulled
some courts into embracing jurisdictional uncertainty. The Eleventh
Circuit, for example, “has cautioned against an inflexible approach to
jurisdictional questions” under Rule 54(b).117 Commentators have also
expressed support for “creating some flexibility.”118 Some courts have
taken the opposite view, continuing to insist on consistent jurisdictional
principles “no matter how significantly the judicial equities may weigh
in favor [of] hearing the appeal.”119 Thus, the confusion engenders not
only inconsistent results, but even inconsistent levels of tolerance for
the inconsistent results. Worse yet, these problems frequently surface
after the parties have devoted significant resources to briefing the
appeal on the merits and preparing for oral argument.120
It would be tempting to blame the confusion entirely on a lack of
guidance in the case law, and some courts and scholars have done so.
One commentator has suggested that the Supreme Court’s few cases
applying Rule 54(b) have complicated what he thinks should be a
straightforward analysis.121 The Fifth Circuit has criticized the Supreme
Court for throwing out “judicial crumbs” that “have failed to lead the
circuit courts to a consensus as to the handling of this confusing area of
law.”122
While there is truth in that criticism, a call for clarity in applying
Rule 54(b) is an overly simplistic suggestion. As the next Section
explains, the various problems that have led to the confusion are not so
easily resolved. They are fundamental to the rule and to some extent
even deliberate. The only certain way to eliminate the problems is, as I
later argue, to eliminate the Rule itself and to substitute in its place a
system of discretionary review that dispenses with the pretense of
uniformity.
C. Dissecting the Flaws
So what are the sources of all this confusion? This Section explains
that the two components of a Rule 54(b) certification—the resolution of
at least one discrete claim and the express determination of no just
reason for delay—both have given rise to difficulties. I first discuss the
117. Brandt v. Bassett (In re Se. Banking Corp.), 69 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1995).
118. E.g., Note, Finality of Judgments in Appeals from Federal District Courts, supra note
55, at 1482 n.35.
119. Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 228 (3d Cir. 2012).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 1–5; see also, e.g., EJS Properties, LLC v. City of
Toledo, 689 F.3d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 2012); Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark Mall Corp., 644 F.3d
375, 378 (7th Cir. 2011); Guippone v. Bay Harbor Mgmt. LC, 434 F. App’x 4 & 7 n.2 (2d Cir.
2011); Transport Workers Union of Am. v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., Local 100, 505 F.3d 226,
230–31 (2d Cir. 2007); Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2005).
121. See generally McFarland, supra note 13, at 286–301; see also supra note 12.
122. Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 2000).
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confusion over what constitutes a claim for purposes of Rule 54(b). I
then turn to the confusion over the discretionary aspect of the district
court’s determination.
1. Claim Confusion: What Constitutes a Discrete Claim Under
Rule 54(b)?
a. The Genesis of the Problem and the Supreme Court’s Unhelpful
Contributions
The first component of a Rule 54(b) determination requires the
district court to resolve at least one claim in a multi-claim action. The
inquiry involves “delineat[ing] the point at which one claim parts
company with another.”123 This has been described as “[t]he most
difficult problem in applying Rule 54(b).”124
The premise is simple enough—and easy enough to apply when a
single lawsuit contains two or more indisputably distinct claims. Thus, a
plaintiff who sues the same defendant on two entirely different bases—
for example, for breaching a sales contract and for negligence resulting
in an automobile collision—has clearly asserted two claims that can be
the subject of separate adjudications under Rule 54(b). By contrast, the
automobile collision itself is unlikely to give rise to more than a single
claim (although there may be circumstances in which some courts
would hold that it does). These cases fit nicely within the familiar
definition of “claim” that we use in the res judicata context: “[A]ll
rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to
all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out
of which the action arose.”125
But not all lawsuits involve such easy determinations. What if the
plaintiff alleges several different, and arguably unrelated, breaches of
the same contract?126 What if the parties have multiple contracts that are
all part of an ongoing business relationship that goes awry?127 What if
the plaintiff asserts common-law claims together with statutory claims
that partially, but do not entirely, overlap?128 What if a plaintiff alleges
that she was fired because of some combination of age, gender, and

123. Brandt v. Bassett (In re Se. Banking Corp.), 69 F.3d 1539, 1547 (11th Cir. 1995).
124. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, supra note 16, at 359 (footnote omitted).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982); see also Alexandra D. Lahav,
The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 601 (2012) (“Claim preclusion only
applies to claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence.”).
126. E.g., Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Thompson
Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1067–68 (7th Cir. 1981).
127. E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 430–31 (1956).
128. E.g., City of N.Y. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00
MDL 1898 (SAS), 04 CIV. 3417 (SAS), 2010 WL 1328249, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010).
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racial discrimination?129 And what if—as in Planned Parenthood130—
the plaintiff raises multiple arguments challenging the constitutionality
of a single statute?
These and other problems underlie the confusion over the first
component of a Rule 54(b) determination: “[I]t has never been clear
when an action presents multiple claims”131 or “whether a particular
order disposed of a separate claim for relief.”132 The problem is not
unique to Rule 54(b); the Supreme Court, outside the Rule 54(b)
context, has acknowledged that the word “claim” can “carry a variety of
meanings.”133 But in the case of Rule 54(b) it poses a jurisdictional
problem that arises every time a litigant asks a district court to enter a
partial final judgment and in every appeal where the district court has
done so.
The problem existed at the outset. Some early cases adopted a view
that the term referred to “a single set of facts or a single transaction.”134
Under the original version of the Rule, the Supreme Court seemed to
accept that definition; in a 1942 case, the Court noted that it was “clear
that . . . differing occurrences or transactions . . . form[ed] the basis of
separate units of judicial action.”135 That was a fairly easy conclusion to
draw based on the text of the original version of the Rule, which
referred to “a determination of the issues material to a particular claim
and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence
which is the subject matter of the claim.”136
But even in the Rule’s infancy, some courts applied a more-liberal
definition of claim—one that favored a finding of finality—than they
had applied when construing the same term in other civil-procedure
contexts.137 The discrepant usage created immediate “uncertainty”
129. See, e.g., Stearns v. Consol. Mgmt., Inc., 747 F.2d 1105, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984)
(alleging age and gender discrimination).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 1–5.
131. Stewart, supra note 10, at 327.
132. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, supra note 16, at 358; see also Minority
Police Officers Ass’n v. City of S. Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 199 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Unfortunately, it is
sometimes unclear whether a complaint or other pleading presents ‘one claim for relief’ or
multiple claims.”).
133. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 210 (1993) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1500
(2006)); see also Torres v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 151 F. App’x 402, 408 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“Because ‘claim’ has multiple meanings, this Court must look to the context of the term’s
usage to understand the drafter’s intent.”).
134. E.g., Note, Finality of Judgments in Appeals from Federal District Courts, supra note
55, at 1479 (discussing Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83 (2d. Cir. 1939)).
135. Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283, 285 (1942) (quoting Atwater v. N. Am. Coal Corp.,
111 F.2d 125, 126 (2d Cir. 1940) (Clark, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (1938 version) (emphasis added).
137. Note, Finality of Judgments in Appeals from Federal District Courts, supra note 55, at
1482.
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borne of the appellate courts’ desire to exercise jurisdictional
“discretion in the interests of [their] own convenience.”138 As a result,
“it was soon found to be inherently difficult to determine by any
automatic standard of unity which of several multiple claims were
sufficiently separable from others to qualify for this relaxation of the
unitary principle in favor of their appealability.”139 Indeed, the
uncertainty over finality—whether a district court had fully adjudicated
a discrete claim—was one of the reasons the Rule was amended in
1948.140
Ironically, however, the 1948 amendment made it even harder to
differentiate between claims or to determine if a single action consisted
of multiple claims. True, the amendment forced district-court judges to
express their intention to enter final judgment (rather than leave the
litigants to sort out for themselves whether the court had done so). But
that change had no bearing on the underlying question—whether the
order in question actually resolved a distinct claim in the first place.
Only if it did was the district court authorized to use its discretionary
power to certify. In fact, the 1948 amendment actually removed the one
bit of language in the Rule—the “arising out of the transaction or
occurrence” language141—that had provided at least some measure of
guidance on the claim-differentiation question.
That amendment led to a pair of Supreme Court cases decided in
tandem in 1956: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey142 and Cold Metal
Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co.143 In Sears, the
Court held that a district court had properly certified an order under
Rule 54(b) in a business dispute, where the district court had resolved
only two of four pleaded counts. The Court offered no explanation of
how the counts constituted separate claims; instead it simply expressed
“no doubt that each of the claims dismissed is a ‘claim for relief’ within
the meaning of Rule 54(b).”144 In Cold Metal Process, the Court went a
step further. Citing the 1948 amendment, the Court concluded that a
claim could be the subject of a partial final judgment, notwithstanding a
pending counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence,
if the district court chose to certify it under Rule 54(b).145 The Court
138. Id.
139. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 434 (1956).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 64–75.
141. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (1938 version), with FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (1948
version).
142. 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
143. 351 U.S. 445 (1956).
144. Sears, 351 U.S. at 436 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (1948 version)).
145. Cold Metal Process, 351 U.S. at 452 (“The amended rule, in contrast to the rule in its
original form, treats counterclaims, whether compulsory or permissive, like other multiple
claims.”).
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concluded its discussion by announcing broadly that Rule 54(b) could
be used to “certif[y] a final order on a claim which arises out of the
same transaction and occurrence as pending claims . . . .”146
That single sentence from Cold Metal Process necessarily suggested
that a claim for purposes of Rule 54(b) is something different from a
claim in the res judicata context, in which, by definition, the same
transaction and occurrence gives rise to only one claim.147 That sentence
also marked a stark departure from the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the original Rule; in 1942 the Court had found it “clear that it is
‘differing occurrences or transactions, which form the basis of separate
units of judicial action.’”148 Professor Benjamin Kaplan, reacting to the
1955 decisions, explained that “[w]ith ‘transaction or occurrence’
excised from the rule, the Court has narrowed still further the
dimensions of the unit of judicial action upon which appeal can be
had.”149
Before examining the fallout from these cases, I pause to note that
the language of the Rule and the amendment history did not lead
inexorably to the conclusions the Court reached. Certainly the change
made clear that a district court can enter partial final judgment on a
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, just as it may do so on a
claim—something that the original rule did not explicitly authorize and
that the Supreme Court explicitly forbade.150 But the 1948 amendment
did not redefine “claim” as something other than a “transaction or
occurrence.” The deleted “transaction or occurrence” language that had
appeared in the original Rule did not modify the word “claim”; it
modified “counterclaims.” Under the original Rule, a partial judgment
was final only if it determined “a particular claim” and “all
counterclaims” arising out of the same “transaction or occurrence” as
that claim.151 There is also evidence that the advisory committee to the
1948 amendment intended no significant change by virtue of the
decision to excise the “transaction or occurrence” language. To the
contrary, it expressed a goal of reaffirming “an ancient policy with
clarity and precision,”152 presumably meaning to preclude piecemeal
appeals over the same basic dispute. As it turns out, the revised wording
was neither clear nor precise, and Sears and Cold Metal Process are the
146. Id.
147. See supra text accompanying note 125.
148. See Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283, 285 (1942) (quoting Atwater v. N. Am. Coal
Corp., 111 F.2d 125, 126 (2d Cir. 1940) (Clark, J., concurring)).
149. Kaplan, supra note 90, at 612; see also Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts,
supra note 16, at 359.
150. See Reeves, 316 U.S. at 286 (holding that Rule 54(b) properly applied only to “wholly
separate and distinct transactions”).
151. Stewart, supra note 10, at 332 n.23.
152. 1946 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 72.
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unfortunate results.153 Those cases suggested that claims over the same
basic dispute were, in fact, severable for Rule 54(b) purposes.154
Justice Felix Frankfurter, joined by Justice John Marshall Harlan,
dissented from the Court’s decision in Cold Metal Process and
concurred in the result in Sears. In so doing, he expressed concern over
the Court’s departure from the ancient policy that the advisory
committee had sought to reaffirm:
[W]hat has been the core of the doctrine of finality as
applied to multiple claims litigation—that only that part of
a litigation which is separate from, and independent of, the
remainder of the litigation can be appealed before the
completion of the entire litigation—is no longer to be
applied as a standard, or at least as an exclusive standard,
for deciding what is final for purposes of § 1291.155
He also anticipated the decades of problems that the Sears and Cold
Metal Process decisions would engender, particularly in failing to
articulate a definitive replacement for the now-abandoned ancient
policy: “The Court does not, however, indicate what standards the
district courts and the courts of appeals are now to apply in determining
when a decision is final.”156 Indeed, the decisions provided no such
indication. Although the Court in Sears described what appeared to be
discrete transaction-based harms that formed the basis of the plaintiffs’
complaint, all of them were tied together with “allegations that Sears
[had] used its great size to monopolize commerce and restrain
competition.”157 The Court nowhere explained by what standard these
overarching common allegations were not fatal to the propriety of the
Rule 54(b) certification it endorsed. Nor did it address the likelihood
that the claims could not have been brought in separate lawsuits without
running afoul of claim-preclusion rules.158
In the half-century since the two decisions, the Court has never
retreated from the suggestion that a single transaction and occurrence
can give rise to multiple claims under Rule 54(b). But it also has never
articulated a concrete test that would embrace that suggestion, despite at
153. See McFarland, supra note 13, at 293 (arguing that Sears “is just wrong”).
154. See Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng’g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 452–53
(1956); see also Stewart, supra note 10, at 334.
155. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 439 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Sears also served as his dissent from the
decision in Cold Metal Process.
156. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 144 (noting the absence of explanation for
the Court’s conclusion that claims in Sears were sufficiently distinct for Rule 54(b) purposes).
157. Sears, 351 U.S. at 430.
158. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.

736

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

least two clear opportunities to do so. The first missed opportunity came
in 1976, when the Court shied away from “attempt[ing] any definitive
resolution of the meaning of what constitutes a claim for relief within
the meaning of the Rules.”159
The second missed opportunity came in 1980, when the Court
decided Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co.160 In CurtissWright, the Court held that the severability of resolved claims and
pending counterclaims “turns on their interrelationship.”161 That sounds
at first blush like a retreat from the Sears–Cold Metal Process holding.
But the same paragraph of Curtiss-Wright also says “that counterclaims,
whether compulsory or permissive, present no special problems for
Rule 54(b) determinations,”162 even though compulsory counterclaims,
by definition, involve the same “transaction or occurrence” as the
opposing party’s claims.163 In the end, then, Curtiss-Wright perpetuated
the Sears–Cold Metal Process confusion and, again, provided no
definitive test for lower courts to apply in scrutinizing whether an order
fully adjudicated a discrete claim in a multi-claim action.
To the contrary, Curtiss-Wright only added to the confusion. The
focus of the Court’s decision in that case was the second component of
the Rule 54(b) certification process—the district court’s discretionary
determination that there is no just reason for delay. In conjunction with
that component, the Court held that a district court properly “consider[s]
such factors as whether the claims under review were separable from
the others remaining to be adjudicated.”164 But presumably the
separability analysis should already have taken place in connection with
the threshold determination—whether the adjudicated part of the case
constitutes a separate claim. The Curtiss-Wright decision has thus led
one commentator to urge that separability “is a question relating
primarily to the district court’s discretion” and that making it “a
prerequisite to finding multiple claims usurps” that discretion.165 Of
course, if the separateness of the claims is a discretionary determination
for the district courts in conjunction with the second component of the
Rule 54(b) test, what is left for the first component?
Predictably, the result of these Supreme Court cases has been
chaotic.166 “[C]ourts have been completely unable to settle on a single
159. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 743 n.4 (1976); see also Eldredge v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 2000); Stewart, supra note 10, at 335.
160. 446 U.S. 1 (1980).
161. Id. at 9.
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A) (a counterclaim is compulsory if it “arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim”).
164. Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8.
165. Stewart, supra note 10, at 339; see also Sears, 351 U.S. at 441.
166. The federal judicial system’s annual statistical reports do not capture the number of
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test for determining when claims are ‘separate.’”167 Courts call the
claim-differentiation analysis “very obscure” and lament that judges “on
too few occasions articulate[] the basis for their decisions in this
area.”168 Some courts cite Sears for the proposition that “the rule for
determining multiple claims” does not “mandate[] . . . rigidity”169—a
fairly astounding proposition considering the jurisdictional nature of the
inquiry.170 Some courts are simply “reluctant . . . to rush in where other
courts fear to tread.”171
Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has been openly critical of the Sears and Cold Metal
Process holdings. In a 1983 decision, he expressed a preference for a
rule providing that claims are “never separate for Rule 54(b) purposes if
they arose out of the same factual setting,” but he acknowledged that
“the Supreme Court rejected this approach.”172 He suggested that the
Supreme Court’s holdings were a function of “a time when the caseload
of the federal courts of appeals was much lighter than it is today” and
that these 1956 holdings “may be ripe for reexamination.”173 Instead,
thirty years after Judge Posner’s critique, the Court has shown no sign
of reexamining Sears or Cold Metal Process, and confusion has
continued to reign. And Judge Posner has apparently resigned himself to
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Rule 54(b) even when “the
question is close.”174

district court certifications under Rule 54(b) or the disposition of such certified cases on appeal.
See, e.g., THOMAS F. HOGAN, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF U.S. COURTS, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF
DIRECTOR (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012.aspx.
Nevertheless, the number of reported decisions in this area, only a fraction of which are cited in
this Article, establishes that the problem is large, even if we do not know the precise magnitude.
167. Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Thompson Farms
Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1070 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Okla. Turnpike Auth. v. Bruner, 259 F.3d
1236, 1242–43 (10th Cir. 2001); Allegheny Cnty. Sanitary Auth. v. EPA, 732 F.2d 1167, 1172
(3d Cir. 1984).
168. Brandt v. Bassett (In re Se. Banking Corp.), 69 F.3d 1539, 1547 (11th Cir. 1995); see
also 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., supra note 16, ¶ 202.06[2] (noting that courts find
separability under Rule 54(b) to be “an elusive term” for which there is “no reliable litmus
test”).
169. E.g., Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. Am. Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 1973).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 113–16.
171. Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 932 (5th Cir. 1991).
172. Minority Police Officers Ass’n v. City of S. Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1983)
(Posner, J.) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956), and Cold Metal
Process Co. v. United Eng’g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1956)).
173. Id. at 200–01.
174. See On Command Video Corp. v. Roti, 705 F.3d 267, 270–71 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner,
J.).

738

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

b. The Disparate Claim-Differentiation Tests That Have Emerged
While Justice Black hoped in 1950 that the 1948 amendment would
“chart[] a clear route through the jungle,”175 courts instead have been
left to wander in the jungle and forge their own paths.176 No test for
claim differentiation has emerged as entirely satisfactory,177 so “circuit
courts of appeals have drawn the line of ‘finality’ with an unsteady
hand.”178 Some courts “have invoked claim-preclusion rules,” some
“have looked to the possibility of separate recoveries,” and some “have
concentrated on the underlying facts.”179 None of these tests has
emerged as the prevailing one; even within individual circuits, courts
have not “resolve[d] which amongst these methods is the preferable
method” and have explicitly “decline[d] to do so.”180 This Subsection
discusses each of the tests that courts have variously applied and
explains their respective shortcomings.181
i. One Point of (Supposed) Agreement: Different Legal Theories Do
Not Constitute Different Claims
I start by identifying one concept on which many courts agree: a
claim is defined by something other than the legal theory conferring the
right to relief. “[M]ere variations of legal theory do not constitute
separate claims.”182 Even when “a claimant . . . presents a number of
175. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 517 (1950) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
176. E.g., Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[V]arious
methods to determine what constitutes a ‘claim for relief’ for purposes of Rule 54(b) have
percolated amongst the circuits.”).
177. Stewart, supra note 10, at 344 n.84.
178. Note, Reformulation of the “Final Decision” Rule—Proposed Amendment to Rule
54(b), supra note 83, at 143.
179. Tubos de Acero de Mexico, S.A. v. Am. Int’l Inv. Corp., 292 F.3d 471, 485 (5th Cir.
2002).
180. See, e.g., Eldredge, 207 F.3d at 741; see also Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v.
DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 500 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e have previously recognized that there is no
‘generally accepted test’ for determining what constitutes a separate claim” (quoting Gen.
Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp, Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1028 (6th Cir. 1994) (some internal quotation
marks omitted))).
181. The Seventh Circuit has eschewed a bright-line test and instead has articulated “rules
of thumb to identify certain types of claims that clearly cannot be ‘separate,’ and otherwise
rel[ies] on the sound discretion of district judges to make that determination on a [case-by-case]
basis.” Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Thompson Farms Co.,
642 F.2d 1065, 1070 (7th Cir. 1981). “The court’s suggested rules of thumb are simply an
amalgamation of various approaches taken by appellate courts over the years,” as explained
further below. See Stewart, supra note 10, at 343. Also note that reliance on “the sound
discretion of district judges” ignores the de novo standard of review the Supreme Court requires
for the first component of Rule 54(b) certification. See infra text accompanying notes 248–52.
182. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 642 F.2d at 1071; see also Marseilles Hydro Power, LLC
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alternative legal theories,” that claimant may have “only a single claim
of relief for purposes of Rule 54(b).”183
The need to articulate that principle—that multiple legal theories do
not in and of themselves give rise to multiple claims—springs in part
from pleading conventions, in which a lawyer will typically “organize
her complaint into separate ‘counts’ or ‘statements of claim.’”184 That
organization, in turn, is a carryover from the common-law system in
which each pleading was framed by a single legal issue.185 Some courts
have suggested that pleading legal theories is unnecessary and confuses
the Rule 54(b) analysis.186 The confusion is all the greater when the
legal theories themselves are identified in the pleadings as separate
claims.187 From a Rule 54(b) perspective, certainly, the organization
“make[s] no real difference.”188
But even if most courts agree that the organization of pleadings does
not make a real difference, Sears and Cold Metal Process left room for
doubt on that point.189 And some courts have undermined the utility of
v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 518 F.3d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Amalgamated Meat
Cutters); Sussex Drug Prods. v. Kanasco, Ltd., 920 F.2d 1150, 1154 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“Alternative theories of recovery based on the same factual situation are but a single claim, not
multiple ones.”).
183. Page v. Preisser, 585 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1978); see also Samaad v. City of Dallas,
940 F.2d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Page, 585 F.2d at 339); Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1445 (7th Cir. 1988).
184. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 44 n.6 (1st Cir. 1988).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 40–41.
186. See, e.g., NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A
complaint should limn the grievance and demand relief. It need not identify the law on which
the claim rests, and different legal theories therefore do not multiply the number of claims for
relief.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently emphasized that facts, rather than elements of
legal causes of action, are the key components of pleadings. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009) (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations.”).
187. See NAACP, 978 F.2d at 292 (“Perhaps the judge was led astray by the structure of the
complaint. Identifying legal theories may assist defendants and the court in seeing how the
plaintiff hopes to prevail, but this organization does not track the idea of ‘claim for relief’ in the
federal rules.”). Lawyers organize their legal theories by variously referring to them in pleadings
as “claims,” “causes of action,” and “counts,” and this inconsistent nomenclature also
contributes to the problem, because these terms enjoy no consistent usage in the law.
Sometimes, for example, courts construe “claim” as synonymous with “cause of action.” See,
e.g., Liberte Capital Group, LLC v. Capwill, 462 F.3d 543, 554 (6th Cir. 2006) (“A ‘claim’ is
defined simply as a ‘cause of action.’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 247 (6th ed. 1990))).
And sometimes they distinguish between the two terms—either explicitly, e.g., Nunley v.
Kloehn, 158 F.R.D. 614, 617 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (“While often times used interchangeably, the
terms ‘cause of action’ and ‘claim’ or ‘count’ are more accurately understood to mean two
different things.”), or implicitly. E.g., United States v. Ripa, 323 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“‘[C]laim’ and ‘cause of action’ have overlapping meanings.”).
188. Spiegel, 843 F.2d at 44 n.6.
189. One student commentator, writing six years after the Court’s 1955 decisions in Sears
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that point by suggesting that differences in proof necessary to prevail on
different “legal theories” may be enough to treat the different legal
theories as separate claims under Rule 54(b).190 The civil-rights context,
in which many of these cases arise,191 illustrates the limitations of the
legal-theories analysis. In many of these cases, the plaintiff asserts
multiple legal theories to redress the same alleged wrong (for example,
employment discrimination or the unconstitutionality of a statute).192 In
some instances, courts have held that the differing legal theories are
immaterial to the claim-differentiation test,193 while in others courts
have held the legal theories to be different enough to constitute separate
claims.194 Thus, even on this basic point, courts have struggled to reach
consistent results.
The legal-theories test, though largely rejected, has a distinct
advantage that no other test can boast: it is easy to apply. A district
court’s decision accepting or rejecting liability on a particular legal
theory enjoys a level of certainty that is absent from the more-accepted
claim-differentiation tests. It is for that reason that my solution to the
and Cold Metal Process, believed that the Court had adopted a definition of claim that turned on
the legal cause of action: “In all probability the Justices implicitly were accepting the cause-ofaction theory, since this narrower concept of claims affords greater flexibility for trial judges to
certify an appeal upon finding ‘no just reason for delay.’” Note, Appealability in the Federal
Courts, supra note 16, at 360.
190. E.g., NAACP, 978 F.2d at 292 (“Two legal theories sufficiently distinct that they call
for proof of substantially different facts may be separate ‘claims.’”); see also Hudson River
Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 418 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
different “legal questions” can inform the determination of whether “the certified claims may be
considered separate claims under Rule 54(b)”).
191. See, e.g., Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 2005) (age
discrimination); Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 826–27 (10th Cir. 2005) (prisoner’s
constitutional rights); Gross v. Pirtle, 116 F. App’x 189, 195 (10th Cir. 2004) (wrongful arrest
and excessive force); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 1992)
(race discrimination); Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1991) (race
discrimination); Spiegel, 843 F.2d at 42 (retaliation in employment based on exercise of civil
rights); Stearns v. Consol. Mgmt., Inc., 747 F.2d 1105, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984) (age and gender
discrimination); Minority Police Officers Ass’n v. City of S. Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 199 (7th Cir.
1983) (race discrimination); Page v. Preisser, 585 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1978)
(unconstitutional state regulations governing entitlement to public benefits).
192. E.g., Stearns, 747 F.2d at 1109 (“Plaintiff is entitled to be free from discrimination on
account of sex and on account of age.”); NAACP, 978 F.2d at 293 (“[The fact that the resolution
of one legal theory would moot or bar remaining theories] is enough, if barely, to justify treating
a legal theory as a ‘claim’ for purposes of Rule 54(b).”); Page, 585 F.2d at 337 (describing
plaintiff’s two constitutional theories for challenging constitutionality of Iowa public-benefit
regulations); see also supra text accompanying notes 1–5 (describing Planned Parenthood’s
challenge to constitutionality of Ohio statute restricting access to abortion-inducing medication).
193. E.g., Page, 585 F.2d at 339 (finding that “alternative constitutional theories”
constituted only one claim).
194. E.g., Stearns, 747 F.2d at 1109 (concluding that age- and gender-discrimination
allegations “rest on separate legal rights and on separate operative facts”).
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Rule 54(b) problem, discussed below,195 embraces it.
ii. The Res Judicata Test: Dead or Alive?
The courts that focus on claim-preclusion rules present a good
example of the long-running confusion over the significance of the 1948
amendment and the legacy of Sears and Cold Metal Process. Early
articulations of this test refer to it as “the ‘pragmatic’ theory,”196
presumably because it presented the pragmatic advantage of
synchronizing the usage of “claim” among various civil-procedure
contexts.197 These cases hold that claims “cannot be separate” under
Rule 54(b) “if together they constitute a single cause of action for res
judicata purposes.”198 As noted above, res judicata depends on the right
to relief stemming from the same transaction or occurrence.199
But most courts have rejected the bright-line res judicata
approach.200 One commentator has suggested that the test “is
dangerously close to a test rejected by the Supreme Court” in Sears.201 I
would go further; although the language in Sears and Cold Metal
Process may be imprecise, the res judicata test is the rejected test. As
one court has explained, if res judicata were a permissible test, then “a
judgment could never be entered in a case in which a compulsory
counterclaim remained pending in the district court, and yet we know it
can be.”202
One would think, then, that the res judicata test is no longer on the
table. But, surprisingly, it remains one of the tests that courts continue
to articulate when conducting a Rule 54(b) claim-differentiation
195. See infra Section III.A.
196. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, supra note 16, at 359.
197. The term “pragmatic” has also been used in conjunction with a Rule 54(b) test that
focuses on “severability and efficient judicial administration” rather than on the transaction-andoccurrence theory. See Cont’l Airlines v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1525
(9th Cir. 1987); see also Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2005).
198. Minority Police Officers Ass’n v. City of S. Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1983);
see also Marseilles Hydro Power, LLC v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 518 F.3d 459, 464 (7th
Cir. 2008); GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 390 F.3d 433, 442 (6th Cir. 2004); Sussex Drug Prods.
v. Kanasco, Ltd., 920 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir. 1990); Tolson v. United States, 732 F.2d 998,
1001–02 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Backus Plywood Corp. v. Commercial Decal, Inc., 317 F.2d 339, 341
(2d Cir. 1963).
199. See supra text accompanying note 125.
200. E.g., Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d 1363, 1367 (7th
Cir. 1990) (“[T]he res judicata status of the two claims is not conclusive under Rule 54(b), and
is probably a diversion from the main issue.”).
201. Stewart, supra note 10, at 327–28, 344–45 n.84.
202. Olympia Hotels, 908 F.2d at 1367; see also NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978
F.2d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Language in some of our cases equates ‘claim’ in Rule 54(b)
with ‘claim’ for purposes of res judicata, but . . . this equivalence cannot accommodate the many
cases that permit separate appeals of claims and compulsory counterclaims.”).
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analysis.203 It is, indeed, tempting to seek a definition that fits
consistently with the use of the word “claim” in other civil-procedure
contexts, as one commentator has recently advocated.204 But, as another
commentator has recognized, the Supreme Court, construing the 1948
amendment, “effectively eliminated ‘separate and independent’ as an
absolute requirement.”205 As a result, Rule 54(b) certification is now
proper “even when adjudicated and unadjudicated claims share a
substantial factual base.”206 Beyond the state of existing law, application
of a res judicata test as a basis for conferring mandatory appellate
jurisdiction is fraught with difficulty, because res judicata itself is not
always easy to evaluate.207 Thus, advocating a rule change or
persuading the Supreme Court to revisit Sears and Cold Metal Process
is not an adequate solution.
iii. The Separate-Recoveries Test: Begging the Question
Some courts and commentators have sought a tidy solution to the
problem by circumscribing claims based on the number of potential
recoveries. “[I]f the possible recoveries under various portions of the
complaint are mutually exclusive, or substantially overlap, then they are
not separable claims.”208 The Eleventh Circuit has characterized the
separate-recoveries test as “the touchstone for determining whether an
entire ‘claim’ has been adjudicated for the purposes of Rule 54(b).”209
The separate-recoveries test focuses on the number of wrongs to be
redressed rather than on the potential causes.210
The Supreme Court has decided only one case after Sears and Cold
Metal Process in which it explicitly differentiated claims under
Rule 54(b). In that case, Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.,211
the Court seems to have applied the separate-recoveries test. The
plaintiffs in Seatrain challenged a decision of the Secretary of
203. E.g., Marseilles Hydro Power, 518 F.3d at 464; GenCorp, 390 F.3d at 442.
204. McFarland, supra note 13, at 295–96 (“One way of recognizing one claim” under
Rule 54(b) “is by recognizing a single transaction or occurrence,” as we do for joinder, crossclaims, and relation back of amendments.).
205. Steinman, supra note 62, at 810.
206. Id. at 812.
207. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1107 (1999) (“[R]es judicata law, despite its
apparent simplicity, can be very difficult to apply.”); see also supra text accompanying note
110; infra text accompanying notes 260–62.
208. Brandt v. Bassett (In re Se. Banking Corp.), 69 F.3d 1539, 1547 (11th Cir. 1995); see
also Marseilles Hydro Power, 518 F.3d at 464; Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d
737, 741 (5th Cir. 2000); Rees, supra note 16, at 236.
209. Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 780 (11th Cir.
2007).
210. Rees, supra note 16, at 237–38.
211. 444 U.S. 572 (1980).
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Commerce that lifted restrictions on the use in domestic trade of their
competitor’s supertanker, the Stuyvesant, constructed under a federal
subsidy program.212 The plaintiffs also challenged, more generally, the
Secretary’s authority to lift those restrictions on any ship constructed
under the program.213 The Court held that the specific challenge
directed to the use of the Stuyvesant and the general challenge to the
Secretary’s authority were separable claims with “two quite different
sorts of relief sought.”214 But the Court’s discussion of Rule 54(b) in
Seatrain is so brief that it reads as an afterthought, as if added to the
opinion only to justify appellate jurisdiction once the Court had already
addressed the case on its merits. It does little to end the confusion
created by Sears, Cold Metal Process, and Curtiss-Wright, and it
certainly cannot be fairly said to have embraced the separate-recoveries
test and rejected all others.215
In any event, the separate-recoveries test is unworkable in many
situations. It fails to accommodate cases involving multiple
constitutional challenges, which tend to “seek the same declaratory and
injunctive relief”216 but can involve different facts that inform “distinct
constitutional rights.”217 It similarly appears inapposite when a habeascorpus petitioner raises multiple challenges to a criminal conviction,
because success on any theory results in the same relief.218 It presents
problems for appellate courts that sometimes have to guess about
recovery rights in the absence of a fully developed record.219 It also
212. Id. at 574, 578.
213. Id. at 580.
214. Id. at 581.
215. Indeed, the Court arguably relied on something other than the separate-recoveries test
in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). There, the plaintiffs challenged
an agricultural regulation on “a number of constitutional and statutory grounds.” Id. at 535, 555.
The Court noted that the district court ruled only on the First Amendment challenge and
“certified its resolution of the First Amendment claim as final” under Rule 54(b). Id. at 556. The
Court could not have applied the separate-recoveries test because all of the plaintiffs’ challenges
sought the same relief: a finding that the regulation was unconstitutional. See Livestock Mktg.
Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 714–15 (8th Cir. 2003), vacated, 544 U.S. 550.
Nevertheless, Johanns is of questionable assistance as a predictor of the Supreme Court’s views
on the subject, for two reasons. First, the district court had entered an injunction, so jurisdiction
was independently proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006). Second, the district court in
Johanns actually had ruled on the other constitutional grounds—finding them moot in light of
its decision on the First Amendment challenge. See Livestock Mktg. Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. of
Agric., 207 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1008 (D.S.D. 2002), aff’d, 335 F.3d 711, vacated, 544 U.S. 550.
216. See Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 502 (6th Cir.
2012).
217. See id.
218. See, e.g., Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 937 (9th Cir. 2013) (exercising appellate
jurisdiction over district court’s Rule 54(b) judgment granting writ of habeas corpus on two of
petitioner’s several challenges to state conviction).
219. See, e.g., Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 932 (5th Cir. 1991). In Samaad, the
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tends to work only in one direction; it identifies a non-severable claim
by virtue of a unitary right of recovery,220 but that does not necessarily
mean that multiple rights of recovery justify a finding of multiple
claims. Consider, for example, a case involving an unfair-competition
business dispute in which the plaintiff relies on both state law, which
provides only for compensatory damages, and the federal Lanham Act,
which permits trebled damages and attorney fees.221 There is no logic in
construing that dispute as presenting more than one claim merely
because the federal claim happens to give rise to enhanced damages
unavailable under state law.222 Admittedly, the damages in that scenario
would partially overlap,223 but if we factor overlap into the equation,
where do we draw the line?
And what about a case in which one legal theory gives rise to
damages and another gives rise to injunctive relief, even though the
dispute arises out of the same basic events? Consider, for example, an
employment dispute where a former employee moves to a competitor in
breach of a noncompete agreement and begins to use trade secrets. If the
period of noncompetition has expired, a breach-of-contract claim often
can remedy the harm only through damages.224 But the court can also
issue an injunction to protect against future use of the misappropriated
trade secrets.225 Does that case present one claim or two?
In short, while the separate-recoveries test is sometimes helpful in
identifying single-claim disputes, it is not a reliable test for determining
whether a case presents multiple claims. Its imperfections therefore
limit its utility as a workable rule.

court had to “assum[e] that there [would be] no duplicate recovery for the same injury” before
concluding that two different constitutional theories for challenging the city’s decision to hold
races near plaintiffs’ residence were “separate violations,” and thus separate claims. Id. at 941.
220. See, e.g., Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 781
(11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a common-law theory of indemnification “represented merely
an alternate legal theory for a recovery identical to” a contractual theory, so the two theories
were part of one claim); Brandt v. Bassett (In re Se. Banking Corp.), 69 F.3d 1539, 1549 (11th
Cir. 1995). In Brandt, the Eleventh Circuit held that allegations that bank directors engaged in
wrongful lending practices and failed to consider potential mergers appeared “at first glance to
be distinct” from each other but were in fact a single claim where success on one would
“foreclose at least some—if not all—of the relief sought for” the other. 69 F.3d at 1549.
221. See, e.g., Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., Nos. 08–4221, 08–4775, 2009 WL
1459565, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 2009).
222. See id.
223. See id. (“[T]he same basic compensatory damages are only recoverable one time
under either the state court claims or the Lanham Act count.”).
224. E.g., EMC Corp. v. Arturi, 655 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 2011).
225. E.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 607 (7th Cir. 2001).
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iv. The Factual-Overlap Test: Riddled with Problems
Perhaps the most vexing test courts have articulated to differentiate
claims under Rule 54(b) “concentrate[s] on the facts underlying the
putatively separate claims.”226 Under this approach, “[i]f the facts
underlying those claims are different, [they] may be deemed separate
for Rule 54(b) purposes.”227 On the other hand, “if there is a great deal
of factual overlap between the decided and the retained claims, they are
not separate, and appeal must be deferred till the latter are resolved.”228
This test has logical appeal from these superficial descriptions, but there
are numerous problems with it.
The most immediate problem is that the test offers no clear
boundaries; how much factual overlap is enough to constitute a single
claim? Certainly “if the overlap is complete the claims are the same, the
only possible difference being the legal theory in which they have been
wrapped.”229 But some courts have suggested that the overlap must be
complete for the case to present only a single claim under Rule 54(b)—
that the need to prove different facts to prevail under a different theory
necessarily means that the case involves more than one claim.230 Other
courts suggest that a case presents only a single claim if there is a
“significant factual overlap.”231 At the same time, courts hold that
“claims with overlapping facts are [not] foreclosed from being separate
for purposes of Rule 54(b).”232 The back-and-forth articulations defy a
workable rule, so determining the extent of overlap that fuses two
disputes into a single claim “may sometimes be difficult,”233 to say the
226. Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 2000) (alteration in
original) (quoting Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
227. Id.; see also Minority Police Officers Ass’n v. City of S. Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 201 (7th
Cir. 1983); Purdy Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Champion Home Builders Co., 594 F.2d 1313, 1316
(9th Cir. 1979).
228. Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1984);
see also Samaad, 940 F.2d at 931 (outlining the various approaches to determining what
qualifies as a separate “claim for relief,” and explaining but ultimately declining to apply the
factual-overlap test).
229. Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d 1363, 1367 (7th Cir.
1990).
230. See Purdy, 594 F.2d at 1316 (finding that plaintiff’s two claims were separate for Rule
54(b) purposes where statutory cause of action required proof of “an element not necessary to
the proof of a breach of the franchise agreement”); cf. Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. Am. Petrofina, Inc.,
484 F.2d 1102, 1105 (10th Cir. 1973) (upholding certification after concluding that relevant
facts were not “totally identical”).
231. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1444 (7th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Automatic Liquid Packaging, Inc. v. Dominik, 852 F.2d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
232. E.g., Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 881–82 (9th Cir. 2005).
233. Ind. Harbor Belt, 860 F.2d at 1445.
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least.
The illogical results are the proof in the pudding. The factual-overlap
test has led one court to hold that alleged systematic discrimination
against minorities constituted two claims (one related to hiring
decisions, one related to promotion decisions).234 It has led another
court to differentiate between discrimination theories when only one of
them included an element of intentional misconduct.235 And
constitutional challenges to a city’s decision to hold automobile races
near plaintiffs’ residences were considered different claims “even
though they [arose] out of the same general set of facts.”236 These
holdings are not only questionable; they are also inconsistent with other
factual-overlap decisions that found only one claim even though the
adjudicated and unadjudicated legal theories required proof of different
facts, including lack of ordinary care237 and intent.238
The factual-overlap test is also problematic because it is difficult to
differentiate it from the same-transaction-and-occurrence test that the
Supreme Court rejected in Sears and Cold Metal Process.239 Indeed, the
Seventh Circuit has recognized the inherent problem in relying on the
factual-overlap test: “[O]nly a definition of ‘separate claims’ as claims
resting on entirely different facts could be applied systematically,” but
the “Supreme Court rejected such a mechanical definition.”240 And,
because of Sears, the Sixth Circuit has cautioned against “apply[ing] the
‘operative facts’ test too broadly.”241
The factual-overlap test also provides questionable guidance in cases
that challenge the constitutionality of statutes and regulations. The
Planned Parenthood case, for example, turns on constitutional doctrine
as applied to a state restriction on an abortion-inducing medication.242
The only “factual” event that spawned the dispute was the legislature’s
enactment of the Ohio statute.243 That posture is common in
234. Minority Police Officers Ass’n v. City of S. Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1983).
235. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 292–93 (7th Cir. 1992).
236. Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 927–28, 932 (5th Cir. 1991).
237. Ind. Harbor Belt, 860 F.2d at 1445–46 (7th Cir. 1988) (negligence and strict-liability
theories emanating from chemical leak).
238. Sussex Drug Prods. v. Kanasco, Ltd., 920 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The only
additional evidence that would be required for proof of [the unadjudicated count] is intent to
misrepresent.”).
239. Stewart, supra note 10, at 335 (noting the Supreme Court’s implicit holdings that
“multiple claims can exist even when such claims arise out of the same transaction and involve
considerable factual overlap”); see also McFarland, supra note 13, at 293.
240. Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Thompson Farms
Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1070 (7th Cir. 1981).
241. See Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 501 (6th Cir.
2012).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 1–5.
243. See Planned Parenthood, 696 F.3d at 501 (acknowledging that “the passage of the
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constitutionality cases certified under Rule 54(b).244 The Sixth Circuit
nevertheless looked beyond the statute’s enactment; it examined
whether “the facts attendant to each [allegedly infringed constitutional]
right were . . . sufficiently distinct” and found that they were.245 But
focusing on the relatedness of facts beyond enactment of the statute
seems analytically artificial, at least when reviewing a facial (as
opposed to an as-applied) constitutional challenge. Even in cases where
the challenge springs from an enforcement of the offending statute or
regulation—thus providing some factual event beyond the actual
enactment or promulgation—the event often serves more as a backdrop
for the litigation (conferring standing on the plaintiff) than as a
substantive factual basis for the dispute.246 Thus, in the constitutionality
context, applying the factual-overlap test seems more like a method to
justify appellate jurisdiction than a true inquiry into the propriety of that
jurisdiction.
Finally, the factual-overlap test exposes two of the worst problems
with Rule 54(b)—problems that actually reflect opposite tensions. The
first is that the test blurs the distinction between the ostensibly objective
determination of claim differentiation (as to which district courts
supposedly enjoy no deference) and the subjective determination that
there is no just reason for delay (as to which district courts supposedly
enjoy wide deference).247 One appellate case actually holds that a case
involving factual overlap “should invite an exercise of discretion by the
district court rather than a determination by us that the retained and
appealed claims are or are not separate.”248 The Seventh Circuit has
challenged law” is a common fact underlying all bases for a constitutional challenge”).
244. See, e.g., U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, 705 F.3d 588, 595 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
passage of the individual mandate as part of the [Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010)] is simply one of the
common operative facts before us . . . .”); Geary v. Renne, 708 F. Supp. 278, 279 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (granting partial final judgment on one of several pleaded federal constitutional grounds
in case challenging state-law ban on political parties from endorsing judicial candidates), aff’d,
911 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated, 501 U.S. 312 (1991).
245. Planned Parenthood, 696 F.3d at 501 (court “must also consider the facts relating to
the law’s impact on similar or distinct constitutional rights”); see also U.S. Citizens, 705 F.3d at
595 (“Review of the counts alleged in Planned Parenthood reveals how the facts attendant to
each right were found to be sufficiently distinct.”).
246. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 556 (2005) (reviewing
order certified under Rule 54(b) on fewer than all constitutional challenges to the fee assessed
against plaintiffs and paid by them); Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 822 (10th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting Rule 54(b) certification of order adjudicating some but not all constitutional
challenges to a regulation prohibiting prison inmates from acting as journalists); Page v.
Preisser, 585 F.2d 336, 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1978) (rejecting Rule 54(b) certification of order
adjudicating some of plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to Iowa public-benefits regulations).
247. See supra Section II.A.
248. Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d 1363, 1367 (7th Cir.
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held that resolving whether a case presented “substantially different
facts” is within “the zone of shadings traditionally committed to a
district judge’s discretion.”249 These holdings ignore the Supreme
Court’s directive that claim differentiation is a legal question that
appellate courts must review de novo.250 And ultimately, an inquiry into
factual overlap involves a balancing test—whether the “differences”
between two pleaded legal theories “sufficiently outweigh what they
have in common.”251 But a lower court’s conclusion under a balancing
test is by definition a poor candidate for de novo appellate review and
instead is typically accorded discretion on appeal.252
Paradoxically, the second significant problem is the converse of the
first. Rather than focus on the true purpose of the claim-differentiation
test—to ensure early finality in cases that would have qualified for it
before 1938253—appellate courts frequently focus on policy
considerations designed to accommodate their own workloads. In the
absence of a “bright-line rule,” courts resort to “practical concerns,
particularly the question whether a subsequent appeal of the claims
before the district court will require the court of appeals to revisit the
same issues decided in the first appeal.”254 These practical concerns
encroach on the discretion that Rule 54(b) accords the district court to
weigh the factors that inform the finding of “no just reason for
delay.”255
A recent case illustrates the conflict. In that case, “many of the
claims on appeal and some still pending in the district court stem[med]
from the same occurrence—the collapse of [a] retaining wall in April
2000.”256 But “the issues raised in each part of the case [were] legally
1990).
249. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1992); see also
Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Thompson Farms Co., 642
F.2d 1065, 1070 (7th Cir. 1981) (“[S]ince the exercise of the district court’s discretion in
granting Rule 54(b) certification already involves a balancing [in connection with the second
component], . . . it is hard to see what additional function the formal characterization of claims
as ‘separate’ or ‘identical’ serves.”).
250. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956) (“The District Court
cannot, in the exercise of its discretion, treat as ‘final’ that which is not ‘final’ within the
meaning of [28 U.S.C.] § 1291.”).
251. See Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 502 (6th Cir.
2012).
252. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 423–24
(2007).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 44–60.
254. E.g., Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 827 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Hudson River
Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 418 (2d Cir. 1989); Jack Walters &
Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1984).
255. See supra text accompanying note 102; infra text accompanying notes 264–84.
256. Marseilles Hydro Power, LLC v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 518 F.3d 459, 464
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distinct and involve[d] different facts.”257 Some claims turned on deed
construction, some on the applicable statute of limitations, and some on
questions of causation.258 Mass torts also lend themselves to these kinds
of issues—do we focus on the overarching allegations of the
defendants’ misconduct or the individual accumulations and theories of
damage?259
When we see these kinds of perspective problems in other contexts
(such as insurance-coverage disputes), we recognize that the fact issues
are appropriate for juries to resolve.260 But Rule 54(b) goes to an
appellate court’s mandatory jurisdiction, which should not rest on the
vagaries of individual judges’ perspectives. We should not permit
individual judges to adjudicate these issues “on a case-by-case basis.”261
If a “single definition of claim cannot resolve the variables presented by
each case,”262 then we should not continue to live with a rule that
depends on that definition.
2. No Just Reason for Delay—Or No Just Reason for the Rule?
As shown above, none the varied tests for claim differentiation is
adequate. One court has metaphorically thrown up its hands, acceding
to a low threshold for distinguishing between claims (so long as they are
“legally distinct and involve at least some separate facts”). It held that
the ultimate “power to enter a Rule 54(b) judgment” is “a matter of the
district judge’s discretion.”263 But as this Subsection shows, the district
court’s discretionary determination on the second component of a Rule
(7th Cir. 2008).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 465.
259. See, e.g., Cont’l Airlines v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1525 (9th
Cir. 1987) (concluding that airline’s claims against airplane manufacturer for property damage
arising from negligence and strict liability arising out of airline disaster were severable from
claims for breach of warranty, fraud for property damage and all claims of passenger
indemnification); City of N.Y. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00
MDL 1898(SAS), 04 CIV. 3417(SAS), 2010 WL 1328249, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010)
(holding that each municipal water well allegedly contaminated by defendant’s gasoline gave
rise to distinct claim, even though liability was premised on single decision to manufacture
product, not individual instances of environmental release).
260. See SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC, 467 F.3d 107, 138 (2d
Cir. 2006) (discussing whether 2001 terrorist attacks on World Trade Center were single or
multiple occurrences for insurance-coverage purposes and concluding that “the word ‘event’ is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. As a result, the insurers are not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law”).
261. See Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Thompson
Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1070 (7th Cir. 1981).
262. Sussex Drug Prods. v. Kanasco, Ltd., 920 F.2d 1150, 1154 (3d Cir. 1990).
263. Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev’t Corp., 908 F.2d 1363, 1368 (7th Cir.
1990).
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54(b) certification—whether there is “no just reason for delay”—
presents its own significant problems.
a. What Does “No Just Reason for Delay” Mean?
To begin with, the phrase itself is ambiguous—no just reason for
delay of what? We know only from the history and application of
Rule 54(b) that the what is entry of final judgment, but the rule itself
does not say so clearly. Nor does the rule offer any explanation about
how district courts are expected to go about making that determination.
The Supreme Court has refrained from setting guidelines264 and has
instead vaguely referred to “judicial administrative interests” and “the
equities involved.”265 Courts are thus left to resolve for themselves a
fundamental policy question prompted by the 1948 amendment: how
parsimonious must they be in entering partial final judgment?266
The 1948 advisory committee wanted to limit the use of Rule 54(b)
to the “infrequent harsh case.”267 But, oddly, that is not how they
drafted the Rule. Instead, from a linguistic standpoint, the rule provides
that a Rule 54(b) certification is appropriate unless the district court
finds “just reason for delay,”268 suggesting a presumption of finality.
And in Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court rejected “infrequent harsh
case” as an appropriate qualifier. Even while reiterating that courts must
“assure that application of the Rule effectively ‘preserves the historic
federal policy against piecemeal appeals’”269 and warning that
certification should not “be granted routinely,”270 the Court explained
that “the phrase ‘infrequent harsh case’ in isolation is neither workable
nor entirely reliable as a benchmark for appellate review.”271 Courts
thus recognize that the “myopic approach” of confining Rule 54(b)
appeals to the infrequent harsh case “was rejected by the Supreme
Court.”272
But even after Curtiss-Wright, some appellate courts continue to use
the “infrequent harsh case” language (or words to that effect) as a basis
for evaluating Rule 54(b) certifications.273 They focus on their “already
264. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1980).
265. Id. at 8.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 76–79.
267. 1946 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 72.
268. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
269. Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 7–8 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S.
427, 438 (1956)).
270. Id. at 10.
271. Id.
272. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Cribbs, 918 F.2d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1990); see also,
e.g., Hess v. A.I. DuPont Hosp. for Children, No. 08–0229, 2009 WL 2776606, at *5 n.2 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 28, 2009).
273. E.g., Williams v. Cnty. of Dakota, 687 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2012); O’Bert ex rel.
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huge” dockets and characterize Rule 54(b) certification as a “luxury.”274
This sort of limiting admonition appears time and again in the case
law.275 At the same time, some courts also continue to accept Rule 54(b)
appeals with virtually no scrutiny276 and reiterate the desire “‘to avoid
the possible injustice of a delay in entering judgment . . . by making an
immediate appeal available.’”277
The duality should not come as a surprise. The struggle “to strike a
balance” between early appellate review and conservation of judicial
resources278 predates Rule 54(b) and informed its promulgation.279 What
makes Rule 54(b) unique is that appellate courts technically have
limited power to prevent an appeal from going forward if the case
satisfies the claim-differentiation test; at that point, the discretion
whether to permit appellate jurisdiction resides with district-court
judges. The tension between that normative standard and the appellate
judges’ resistance to it manifests itself in incompatible expressions of
the policies underlying Rule 54(b). One district court has captured the
essence of that conflict by describing the holdings of two Second
Circuit cases “decided two weeks apart”:
In some instances, the Second Circuit has . . . instruct[ed]
district courts only to direct partial final judgment in
“exceptional” cases where failure to enter judgment would
Estate of O’Bert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29, 41 (2d Cir. 2003); Citizens Accord, Inc. v. Town of
Rochester, 235 F.3d 126, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2000); Gen. Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp, Inc. 23
F.3d 1022, 1027 (6th Cir. 1994); Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1004
(3d Cir. 1992); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981) (Kennedy,
J.).
274. E.g., Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 2005).
275. E.g., Taco John’s of Huron, Inc. v. Bix Produce Co., 569 F.3d 401, 402 (8th Cir.
2009); Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 167 (11th Cir. 1997); Nichols
v. Cadle Co., 101 F.3d 1448, 1449 (1st Cir. 1996); Brandt v. Bassett (In re Se. Banking Corp.),
69 F.3d 1539, 1550 (11th Cir. 1995); Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d
1441, 1444 (7th Cir. 1988); Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 44–46 (1st Cir. 1988);
FDIC v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661, 664–65 (7th Cir. 1986); Minority Police Officers Ass’n v. City
of S. Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1983).
276. See, e.g., Order Re Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment and Certification to
Appeal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 54(b) at 2, Mahon v. Chi. Title Ins. Co.,
No. 3:09CV00690(AWT) (D. Conn. June 22, 2010), ECF No. 62 (granting partial final
judgment, with no mention of hardship, because adjudicated claim was “separate and apart
from” unadjudicated claims, would “not arise a second time on appeal,” and reversal “might
avoid a . . . duplicative . . . trial”), aff’d sub nom. Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62
(2d Cir. 2012) (accepting district court’s Rule 54(b) finding with no discussion); see also cases
cited infra note 307 and accompanying text.
277. E.g., Okla. Turnpike Auth. v. Bruner, 259 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting
10 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2654 (2d. 1983)).
278. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2654, at 35.
279. See supra Section I.A.
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work an “unusual hardship” on the litigants. In other
instances, however, it has directly contradicted this
suggestion—asserting that the increasingly complex nature
of litigation “cr[ies] out for flexibility in granting partial
final judgments,” and that courts cannot rely on
“comparative adjectives like ‘unusual’, ‘exceptional’, or
‘extraordinary’ if we wish to chart a sound course for future
panels of this court[.]”280
Clearly these holdings are “at loggerheads,” but “the Second Circuit has
never expressly adopted the rationale of one decision over the other, and
both continue to be cited at the district and the appellate level.”281
Despite the tug and pull of policy considerations, courts do not
review Rule 54(b) certifications in a standardless vacuum. In 1975, the
Third Circuit identified a laundry list of factors for courts to consider
when deciding whether there is no just reason for delay:
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and the
unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for
review might or might not be mooted by future
developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that
the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same
issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim
or counterclaim which could result in set-off against the
judgment sought to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors
such as delay, economic and solvency considerations,
shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims,
expense, and the like.282
Several other circuits have used the same list.283

280. City of N.Y. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Either Prods. Liab.
Litig.), Nos. 00 MDL 1898 (SAS), 04 CIV. 3417 (SAS), 2010 WL 1328249, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 5, 2010) (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hogan v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
961 F.2d 1021, 1025 (2d Cir. 1992), and Ginett v. Computer Task Grp., Inc., 962 F.2d 1085,
1095 (2d Cir.1992)).
281. Id. (footnotes omitted).
282. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Phila. Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1975) (footnotes
omitted). The Supreme Court’s decision in Curtiss-Wright rejected the Allis-Chalmers
requirement that Rule 54(b) certification be limited to cases involving “unusual or harsh
circumstances.” See, e.g., Hess v. A.I. DuPont Hosp. for Children, No. 08–0229, 2009 WL
2776606, at *5 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2009); see also supra text accompanying notes 270–71.
But the Allis-Chalmers discretionary factors nevertheless appear to have survived the CurtissWright decision. See, e.g., MCI Contractors, LLC v. City of Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849, 855 (4th
Cir. 2010); Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 F.3d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 2001);
Corrosioneering, Inc. v. Thyssen Envtl. Sys., Inc., 807 F.2d 1279, 1283 (6th Cir. 1986).
283. See supra note 282.
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These guidelines assist district courts in assessing whether the
inefficiencies of an immediate appeal, including the possibility of
multiple appeals in the same case, are “offset” by the benefits of an
immediate appeal, such as an appellate decision that would “facilitate a
settlement of the remainder of the claims.”284 But the guidelines are
invented by judges applying the nondescript text of the Rule. And, as
explained further below, the guidelines are troublesome for several
reasons.
b. The Confusing Overlap Between Claim Differentiation and “No Just
Reason for Delay”
The district court’s discretionary role to evaluate the pros and cons
of permitting immediate appeal is logical when it comes to several of
the relevant factors, such as the particular harm to the parties of a
delayed judgment and the potential that an early appeal may promote
settlement. But the discretionary decision suffers from an
insurmountable problem: it calls upon district courts to exercise their
discretion in evaluating factors that also bear on the legal analysis of
claim differentiation, which is not supposed to be a discretionary
analysis.285
This problem is in part a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Curtiss-Wright.286 The Seventh Circuit has criticized the Supreme Court
for including separability as one of “the factors for the district court to
consider when exercising its discretion.”287 And the overlap leaves
courts confused about the extent to which the first and second
components collapse into each other,288 which in turn creates “haziness”
in determining the appropriate “standard an appellate court should apply
when reviewing a Rule 54(b) certification.”289

284. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1980).
285. See supra notes 103–07and accompanying text.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 164–65.
287. See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1444 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1988).
288. Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 930 (5th Cir. 1991) (“One commentator has
suggested that some courts have conflated the two inquiries.” (citing 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 54.33[2] (2d ed. 1991))).
289. Ind. Harbor Belt, 860 F.2d at 1444 n.3; see also Brandt v. Bassett (In re Se. Banking
Corp.), 69 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the standard of review for the first
determination “approaches” de novo review but allows “some room for deference[,] particularly
where the district court has made its reasoning clear”); Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer E.,
Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir. 1993) (ignoring de novo component: “[O]ur conventional
review of the district court’s Rule 54(b) certification is for an abuse of discretion”).
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c. Conflicts in the Case Law over the Precise Words a District Court
Must Use
The discretionary component has also resulted in a circuit split over
the precise words a district court must use when finding no just reason
for delay. Some courts, including the Third Circuit in a recent decision,
have focused on the requirement of the word “express” in Rule 54(b)
and have dismissed appeals that fail to use the actual words “no just
reason for delay” or something akin to them. These courts have held
that “Rule 54(b)’s ‘express’ determination is a jurisdictional
prerequisite.”290 So “even in a case . . . in which a district court clearly
intends to enter judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b),” the order is not final
if the right combination of words is missing.291 The district court need
not “use the talismanic phrase ‘there is no just reason for delay’”; it may
“paraphrase or use language ‘of an indisputably similar effect.’”292 But
“even if the record indicates no just reason for delay, an order is not
final under Rule 54(b) unless it contains the ‘express determination’
thereof.”293
The Fifth Circuit, in an en banc decision, took the opposite view,
permitting the appeal to go forward if “the language in the order
appealed from, either independently or together with related portions of
the record referred to in the order, reflects the district court’s
unmistakable intent to enter a partial final judgment under
Rule 54(b).”294 The court rejected a requirement that a district court
“mechanically recite the words ‘no just reason for delay.’”295 It
reasoned that a reference to Rule 54(b), without the actual certification,
290. E.g., Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 221 (3d Cir. 2012); see also EJS
Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 689 F.3d 535, 537–38 (6th Cir. 2012); Stockman’s Water Co. v.
Vaca Partners, 425 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005); Granack v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 977 F.2d
1143, 1145 (7th Cir. 1992); LTV Steel Co. v. United Mine Workers (In re Chateaugay Corp.),
928 F.2d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1991); Mooney v. Frierdich, 784 F.2d 875, 876 (8th Cir. 1986).
291. Elliott, 682 F.3d at 224–25; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 325
F.3d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding case where district court had expressly determined
that there was no just reason for delay in an amended Rule 54(b) certification but had done so
after adequacy of original certification was already the subject of appellate scrutiny, thus
depriving the district court of jurisdiction to amend the Rule 54(b) certification).
292. Elliott, 682 F.3d at 225 (quoting Berckeley Inv. Grp. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 F.3d 135,
141 (3d Cir. 2001)).
293. Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 456 F.3d 167, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
294. Kelly v. Lee’s Old Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc., 908 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (per curiam) (10–7 decision); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo,
884 F.2d 688, 693–94 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding appellate jurisdiction where district court “merely
wrote the words ‘Motion granted So ordered’ and signed the cover of the notice of motion”
because hearing the appeal would “make possible a more expeditious and just result for all
parties” (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 875 F.2d 1008, 1014 (2d Cir.
1989))).
295. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1220.
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“expressly incorporates the entire rule by reference and signals its
conclusion that the requirements of the rule have been met and entry of
partial final judgment is proper.”296 The dissent lamented the lack of
clarity in the court’s decision, preferring instead “a bright-line test that
will warn litigants when the thirty-day clock begins ticking for purposes
of appealing a partial final judgment entered under [R]ule 54(b).”297
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that its decision was “obviously not
the only possible interpretation of this rule” and that the “circuits are
also sharply divided on this issue.”298 The division is another anathema
to the goal of jurisdictional clarity that plagues Rule 54(b).
d. Conflicts in the Case Law over the Level of Required Detail and the
Consequences of Failing to Provide It
Apart from the ambiguity of the phrase “no just reason for delay”
and the question whether a court must mechanically recite it verbatim,
there is disagreement about the extent to which a district court must
explain its rationale in certifying a partial final judgment. Rule 54(b) on
its face provides no guidance. But some appellate courts have imposed a
requirement that district courts provide a rationale,299 leading to a
mishmash of approaches.300
In some circuits, the explanation is jurisdictional; these courts “have
frequently dismissed appeals where no reasoned explanation for the
Rule 54(b) judgment was given.”301 Other courts have held that “the
absence of such specific findings is not fatal”;302 instead, it simply
converts the standard of review from abuse of discretion to de novo or

296. Id. at 1220–21.
297. Id. at 1227–28 (Smith, J., dissenting). The dissent’s reasoning hearkens back to the
reason for adding the certification requirement in the first place, in 1948. See supra text
accompanying notes 64–69.
298. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1221 n.2; see also id. at 1229 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is a
clean split among the circuits on this discrete issue of appellate jurisdiction.”).
299. E.g., O’Bert ex rel. Estate of O’Bert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29, 41 (2d Cir. 2003); Akers
v. Alvey, 338 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2003).
300. See Gross v. Pirtle, 116 F. App’x 189, 194 n.9 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting varying
approaches among the circuits).
301. O’Bert, 331 F.3d at 41; see also Sua Sponte Order Dismissing Appeal for Lack of a
Final Appealable Judgment at 3, Crouch v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 11-06109 (6th Cir. Jan.
19, 2012) (dismissing appeal for “lack of a final appealable judgment” where district court “did
not address any of the[] factors” underlying a finding of “no just reason for delay” (quoting in
part Solomon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 782 F.2d 58, 61 (6th Cir. 1986))); Stockman’s Water Co. v.
Vaca Partners, L.P., 425 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. Babbitt, 161
F.3d 740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
302. E.g., Gross, 116 F. App’x at 194; see also Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding that lack of explanation for certification “is not a jurisdictional defect”
(quoting Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Carlsberg Fin. Corp., 689 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982))).
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heightened scrutiny.303 Some have held that the failure to articulate the
reasons for the discretionary determination is not a jurisdictional defect
“when the propriety of the appeal may be discerned from the record.”304
The Sixth Circuit has suggested that it is more inclined to overlook a
bald assertion of “no just reason for delay” if the error is caught after
the case is “briefed and argued,” since “the scales of judicial economy
are now tipped in favor of disposing of the appeal on the merits.”305 The
Fifth Circuit—which does not require mechanical recitation of the
language of the Rule306—also appears to require no explanation.307
These applications of Rule 54(b) are all over the map (literally and
figuratively). Even circuits that consider the explanation jurisdictional
are inconsistent in enforcing that requirement.308 And courts that require
precise use of the “no just reason for delay” language or detailed
reasoning for certification have sometimes resorted to jurisdictional
acrobatics to overcome deficiencies—either dismissing the appeal but
promising “reinstatement” if the district court fixes the problem309 or
remanding the case with instructions that the district court “supply its
reasons.”310 The Rule’s confusing requirements and the draconian
consequences that can result from misapplying it have prompted one
court to place extra “responsibility” on lawyers to help district courts
certify their orders properly.311 But the Rule is not worth all this trouble.
There is a better solution.

303. E.g., Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1988); see also
Williams v. Cnty. of Dakota, 687 F.3d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 2012); cf. U.S. Citizens Ass’n v.
Sebelius, 705 F.3d 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The district court's reasoned analysis of the
factors, although thin, offered more than a simple recitation of the Rule 54(b) formula;
therefore, the court's decision is entitled to substantial deference.”).
304. Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 346 (3d Cir. 1999).
305. Akers v. Alvey, 338 F.3d 491, 495–96 (6th Cir. 2003).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 294–97.
307. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 686 F.3d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 2012),
aff’g Order on Counter-Claimant’s Motion for the Entry of a Rule 54(b) Final Judgment,
No. 3:09-CV-473-HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. May 4, 2011), ECF No. 237 (entering Rule 54(b)
judgment with no elaboration of factors underlying finding of “no just reason” for delay);
Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 740 n.2 (5th Cir. 2000); Ackerman v. FDIC,
973 F.2d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1992).
308. See, e.g., ACLU v. Dep’t of Justice, 681 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’g in part and
rev’g in part Order on Final Judgment on Fourth and Fifth Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment at 3, No. 1:04-cv-4151-AKH (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010), ECF No. 427 (entering partial
final judgment under Rule 54(b) with minimal explanation).
309. E.g., EJS Properties, LLC v. City of Toledo, 689 F.3d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 2012).
310. E.g., Feliz v. MacNeill, 493 F. App’x 128, 2012 WL 3590807, at *2 n.3 (1st Cir.
2012).
311. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 431, 442 (3d Cir.
2003).
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III. THE SOLUTION: REPLACE RULE 54(B) WITH A PROCEDURE FOR
DISCRETIONARY APPELLATE REVIEW
A. The Preferable, All-Discretionary Approach of § 1292(b)
The solution to the Rule 54(b) problems is surprisingly simple, yet
no commentator has previously proposed it. We do not need a rule that
requires courts to engage in the tortuous process of claim
differentiation. And we do not need a rule that requires appellate courts
to exercise jurisdiction against their will (or to twist the rule in order to
justify withholding jurisdiction). What we need is a system of
discretionary appellate review that permits district courts to continue to
certify some of their interlocutory orders for early appeal while
explicitly conferring on appellate courts the discretion to refuse them.
We not only need such a system; we already have it. That is precisely
the scheme that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) already offers.
That statute, enacted in 1958,312 permits appeals from interlocutory
orders in civil cases if both the trial court and the court of appeals
believe that the order “involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation.”313 Once the trial court issues a
certification order under § 1292(b), a party seeking to appeal files a
petition for discretionary review in the appellate court.314 The appellate
court is then free to accept or reject the appeal “for any reason,
including docket congestion.”315
Application of the § 1292(b) procedure would solve all of the
difficulties with Rule 54(b) identified above. With the right language,316
the statute would permit district courts to certify orders for immediate
appeal without tripping over the analysis of whether the order
completely resolved a single “claim.” Instead, the statute could permit
certification whenever a district court issued an order that adjudicated a
party’s rights under an asserted legal theory. All of the debate over the
various tests for claim differentiation (and reconciling those tests with
Sears and Cold Metal Process) would end. Identifying whether a legal
theory is discrete or fully resolved presents none of the challenges of
claim differentiation; it is simple and mechanical.
Likewise, vesting discretion in both trial and appellate courts would
eliminate all of the debate over the meaning and application of the “no
312. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (2006)).
313. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).
314. See FED. R. APP. P. 5(a).
315. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978).
316. See infra text accompanying notes 329–31.
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just reason for delay” requirement. There would be no need to evaluate
whether the district court’s certification was sufficiently explicit or
whether the explication of the district court’s reasoning was sufficiently
complete. There would be no confusing overlap, as there is now with
the first and second components of the Rule 54(b) certification process.
Perhaps most importantly, a § 1292(b)-type procedure would
dismantle the existing standard-of-review problem. The district court
would retain its role as “dispatcher,”317 but appellate courts could
overtly form their own value judgments about the pros and cons of
permitting immediate appeal in individual cases without fear of treading
on the district court’s discretion. In short, if the district court is the
dispatcher, the appellate court would serve as its own gatekeeper. This
structure would be, to use Professor Martin Redish’s nomenclature, an
“intelligent use of the pragmatic approach to the appealability of
interlocutory orders.”318
An all-discretionary system would also eliminate any confusion
about loss of appellate rights. The uncertain application of Rule 54(b)
leaves reasonable litigants with no choice but to appeal immediately to
ensure that they preserve those rights, even when they harbor doubts
about the propriety of certification.319 Indeed, some courts have held
that “[a] Rule 54(b) determination, right or wrong, starts the time for
appeal running.”320 All of that uncertainty and risk fall away in an alldiscretionary system. There is still the possibility that the appellate court
will reject the petition for discretionary appeal, but that rejection has no
adverse impact on the right to appeal at the conclusion of the entire
case.
Finally, elimination of Rule 54(b) would put to rest a persistent
confusion about whether a trial court, wishing to facilitate immediate
review, should invoke the Rule or the statute.321 Appellate courts
317. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435 (1956).
318. Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 89, 92, 109 (1975) (suggesting, however, that the appellate court alone should
determine whether to hear the appeal and that it should not depend on a trial court’s discretion).
319. See Gerson, supra note 16, at 175–76. For example, in Gross v. Pirtle, 116 F. App’x
189 (10th Cir. 2004), the plaintiff failed to take an immediate appeal from an order that he later
argued the district court improperly certified under Rule 54(b). Id. at 193. The Tenth Circuit
held that the “Rule 54(b) certification was proper” and that the plaintiff’s “failure to timely
appeal”—within 30 days of the order, rather than within 30 days of the conclusion of the rest of
the case—“deprives us of jurisdiction.” Id. at 195.
320. E.g., In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 1995); see also A-1 Amusement Co. v.
United States, 15 F. App’x 777, 781 (Fed. Cir. 2001). But see Page v. Preisser, 585 F.2d 336,
338 (8th Cir. 1978) (“[W]hen a district court erroneously certifies a claim as appropriate for
immediate appeal under Rule 54(b), a party may raise that claim in a timely appeal from an
adverse decision on the remaining claims in the lawsuit.”).
321. See NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 1992)
(suggesting that the trial judge “confused Rule 54(b) with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)”); see also Local
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periodically admonish district courts that they have misused Rule 54(b)
and that “§ 1292 represents the more appropriate course.”322 By
contrast, “several cases have treated Rule 54(b) certifications as
§ 1292(b) certifications.”323 The inconsistency is especially troubling
because resort to Rule 54(b) rather than § 1292 confers mandatory
appellate jurisdiction, “evade[s]” the appellate court’s discretion not to
hear the appeal,324 and requires the aggrieved party to appeal
immediately or risk losing appellate rights. The Seventh Circuit has
recognized a need to “keep Rule 54(b) distinct from § 1292(b)”; to do
so it scrutinizes Rule 54(b) certifications to ensure no “overlap”
between the issues on appeal and those that remain with the district
court.325 But the scrutiny for overlap is one of the problems that leads to
all the confusion and uncertainty in applying Rule 54(b). Converting to
an overtly discretionary system rids us of these problems.
Why, then, have we not already moved to an all-discretionary
system? For one thing, it has its own imperfections, as noted below.326
But it appears that the primary reasons for not revisiting the structure of
Rule 54(b) have been oversight and inertia. Congress had not yet
enacted § 1292(b) in 1938, when the original Rule 54(b) was
promulgated, or in 1948, when the Rule was amended to add the
discretionary-certification step. Curiously, the advisory committee in
1961 recognized that § 1292(b) “may now be available for the multipleparties cases” that were added to Rule 54(b) that year.327 But the
advisory committee concluded, without explanation, that the rule was a
better mechanism for those cases.328 Even so, the 1961 committee made
P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d
1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that the parties proceeded under Rule 54(b) even though the
district court order “purported to certify the orders for permissive interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b)”).
322. E.g., Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 168 (11th Cir. 1997);
see also Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1336 n.4 (4th Cir. 1993);
Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 46 n.7 (1st Cir. 1988); Morrison-Knudsen Co., v.
Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1981) (Kennedy, J.).
323. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 642 F.2d at 1071 (7th Cir. 1981) (Wisdom, J.); see also
Tolson v. United States, 732 F.2d 998, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (declining to convert improper
Rule 54(b) certification to § 1292(b) certification but noting that in “an appropriate case, the
requested conversion . . . might well be in order at the appellate court level”); Bergstrom v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 599 F.2d 62, 64 (8th Cir. 1979). But see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel,
424 U.S. 737, 745–46 (1976) (refusing to construe improper Rule 54(b) certification as proper
certification under § 1292(b) given the different mechanisms for seeking interlocutory appeal
under the latter).
324. Morrison-Knudsen, 655 F.2d at 966.
325. See Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bobst Grp. USA, Inc., 392 F.3d 922, 924 (7th Cir. 2004).
326. See infra Section III.B.
327. 1961 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 91, at 7.
328. Id.; see also Kaplan, supra note 90, at 616–17.
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no mention of the fact that the statute, enacted after the 1948
amendment, could also have served as a basis for appealing in multiclaim cases.
B. Responses to the Shortcomings of § 1292(b)
The mechanism of § 1292(b) is not without its problems. But as this
final Section shows, the problems are not insurmountable, and the
benefits outweigh them.
1. Fixing the Text
As a textual matter, § 1292(b) in its present form is not perfectly
suited to the purposes of Rule 54(b). Section 1292(b) addresses itself to
the resolution of dispositive legal issues, and, to be sure, early
resolution of unsettled legal issues arguably can fall within the
discretionary factors that courts consider when certifying under the
Rule.329 But the resolution of a discrete claim under Rule 54(b) does not
necessarily involve a legal question “as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion.”330 Indeed, the resolution of a discrete
claim can turn on entirely on the facts and involve no legal controversy
at all.
To address this concern, § 1292(b) would have to be amended, and
the language of the amendment would have to avoid the problems that
plague Rule 54(b). Primarily, we need to steer clear of having to
determine what constitutes a “claim.” I propose the following
amendment to § 1292(b) (proposed new language in italics):
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an
order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be
of the opinion that such order either:
(i) involves a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion or
(ii) adjudicates entitlement to relief under particular
legal theories,
and also concludes that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation or that the benefits of an immediate appeal
outweigh the costs, he or she shall so state in writing in
such order. The Court of Appeals which would have
jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in
its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order,
329. See supra text accompanying notes 282–84.
330. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).
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if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of
the order: Provided, however, That application for an
appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district
court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a
judge thereof shall so order.
The first added phrase—“adjudicates entitlement to relief under
particular legal theories”—would permit discretionary appeals from
determinations of liability or non-liability under any of the legal
theories presented in the case. This language is perhaps coextensive
with the view of “claim” under Rule 54(b) that most cases have
rejected.331 But that broad view is no longer problematic, because it
would not require review in every case in which a district court
adjudicates liability under a given legal theory, or even every case in
which a district court then certifies that adjudication for immediate
appeal. Instead, appellate courts would enjoy the discretion to decline to
hear interlocutory appeals in such cases.
To guide district courts in determining when certification is
appropriate, the second added phrase—“or that the benefits of an
immediate appeal outweigh the costs”—embraces the balancing test that
underlies all forms of early appellate review.332 Instead of the confusing
“no just reason for delay” language, I propose instructing district courts
that certification of an order resolving liability under a particular legal
theory is warranted when, on balance, the value of immediate appeal
outweighs any delay in trial-court proceedings and any potential
inefficiencies at the appellate level (captured simply with the single
word costs). This test would require district courts to determine whether
an immediate appeal would delay the resolution of the rest of the case
and whether it would likely lead to multiple appeals on duplicative
issues—two of the major barriers to certification under Rule 54(b).333 If
an immediate appeal would lead to delay, duplication, or both, the
district court would have to determine whether the benefits of the appeal
outweigh these drawbacks. Importantly, if the district court finds that an
appeal is warranted, the appellate court would then have the final say in
the matter.
An amendment to § 1292(b) is not the only way to accomplish this
change. Another solution might be to amend Rule 54(b) itself.334 The
331. See supra text accompanying notes 182–94.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 31–34.
333. See supra text accompanying note 282.
334. To the extent such an amendment would amount to an additional avenue of
interlocutory appellate review (rather than a modification of an existing one), Congress has
vested the Supreme Court with the power to promulgate rules creating that avenue. See 28
U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006). The Court has used that power only once, in creating a discretionary
right of appeal from orders that grant or deny class-action status. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); see
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statutory approach is probably better for two reasons. First, amending
the statute would aggregate two of the most important provisions for
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction and would thus help reduce the
balkanization of jurisdictional rules that scholars have criticized.335
Second, Rule 54(b) is part of a larger civil rule governing judgments;336
under my proposal, orders certified for discretionary review would no
longer carry with them the status of a final judgment, so the amended
provision would not seem to fit.337 But the precise location of the
provision is ultimately less important than its substance. So long as we
eliminate the existing text of Rule 54(b) and replace it with a system of
dual discretion along the lines described above, we will go a long way
toward stabilizing appellate jurisdiction over orders that resolve less
than an entire action.
2. Obtaining Meaningful Early Review
Another problem of replacing Rule 54(b) with a purely discretionary
system—and of giving both trial and appellate courts full discretion to
permit or refuse interlocutory review—is that it could curtail
meaningful opportunities for such review. I have previously criticized
the § 1292(b) mechanism for precisely that reason: it permits courts to
evade prejudgment appellate review in certain situations where it is
warranted.338
The important question, then, is when is it warranted? I have argued
that legal error in multidistrict litigation (MDL) can be devastating for
the litigants and the public and that deferring appellate review of certain
interlocutory MDL orders is unacceptable.339 High-impact legal
decisions in MDLs are an example of what Professor Timothy Glynn
calls “problem areas,” where appellate courts should have no discretion
to reject interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.340 In those categorical
circumstances, § 1292(b) is ineffectual, because it confers on both trial
and appellate courts unbridled power to prevent immediate appeal.
But the need for interlocutory appeal in multi-claim litigation is not
categorical. It arises on a case-by-case basis and focuses on the discrete
hardship that litigants will suffer if final judgment is delayed, balanced
against the cost of permitting an immediate appeal. That is precisely
why Rule 54(b) already vests discretion in district courts. My proposal
also Pollis, supra note 15, at 1657, 1694 n.80.
335. See Steinman, supra note 29, at 1238–39.
336. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 54.
337. See infra text accompanying notes 350–54.
338. See Pollis, supra note 15, at 1658–59.
339. See id. at 1663, 1667–84.
340. See id. at 1663 (quoting Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion:
Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 259 (2001)).
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does not remove that discretion, but it does permit the appellate court to
have a say in the matter, eliminating the anomalous Rule 54(b) dynamic
of permitting district courts to control the appellate-court docket.
Conferring discretion on appellate courts is already familiar. All
other bases for discretionary appeal341 depend on the appellate courts’
willingness to hear a case, and many commentators have suggested that
district courts should never have a say.342 Under my proposal, district
courts would continue to exercise their superior vantage points to
dispatch only those interlocutory orders appropriate for immediate
appeal, thus retaining control over their own dockets and limiting the
cases that appellate courts would have discretion to consider. At the
same time, the more-liberal standards for certification run the risk of
flooding appellate courts with interlocutory appeals and thus require a
counterbalance in the form of overt appellate-court jurisdictional
discretion.
I say “overt” because appellate-court discretion under Rule 54(b)
already lurks in the background343 even if courts are loath to
acknowledge it openly. Many appellate courts find an abuse of
discretion to certify simply because they disagree with the district
court’s decision.344 The abuse-of-discretion standard can also provoke
disagreements on an appellate panel about the extent to which appellate
courts should substitute their judgments for those of the district court
that issued the certification.345 My proposal embraces that discretion,
giving rise to more-honest decision making and fewer inconsistent
applications of the abuse-of-discretion standard.
Of course, trial and appellate courts would have different incentives
for granting or refusing certification. These differences would matter
only when the trial court certifies a case, because only then does the
appellate court have to weigh in. The trial court may prefer early
guidance on a disputed legal question in order to resolve the remainder
of the case more efficiently, while the appellate court may prefer to
avoid the possibility of hearing multiple appeals in the same case. This
is precisely the sort of balancing test that both courts should be
permitted to conduct. Both should have veto power. But bear in mind
341. See supra note 28.
342. See Pollis, supra note 15, at 1660–62; see also supra note 347 and accompanying text.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 273–77.
344. E.g., Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, 642 F.3d 304, 314 (2d Cir. 2011); Taco John’s
of Huron, Inc. v. Bix Produce Co., 569 F.3d 401, 402 (8th Cir. 2009); Huggins v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 566 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2009).
345. Compare Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1336 (4th Cir.
1993) (“[T]he Rule 54(b) certification . . . was not within the proper bounds of the district
court’s discretion”), with id. at 1342 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (“. . . I would not disturb the district
court’s exercise of discretion in entering judgment. That decision—amply supported—was not
only well within the court’s discretion, it was an appropriate exercise of its discretion.”).

764

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

that a veto does not undermine the right of appeal; all it affects is the
timing.
The addition of appellate-court discretion would displease
commentators who favor expanding Rule 54(b) to avoid its definitional
problems but leaving intact the district court’s sole discretion to
determine orders suitable for immediate appeal.346 That suggestion is
appealing, because at first blush it seems simpler and less likely to lead
to jurisdictional battles in the appellate court. It also dovetails with the
views of scholars who are skeptical of vesting discretion in appellate
courts because of their institutional bias in favor of limiting appeals.347
But it suffers from two major problems. First, the political opposition to
such a suggestion dooms it from the start, as appellate judges would
likely rally against any proposal to expand a district court’s discretion to
determine mandatory appellate jurisdiction. Second, that proposal
would still permit appellate courts to review certification orders to
ensure that district courts had not abused their discretion,348 so the
jurisdictional battles would still occur. Indeed, those battles would
perpetuate the existing confusion over the extent of deference appellate
courts would be required to accord to district courts’ certification
orders.
In the end, explicitly authorizing appellate courts to exercise
discretion will permit more-honest debate at the appellate level about
the need for immediate appeal. We cannot know in advance whether my
proposal would meaningfully reduce the number of merit decisions in
worthy cases. But it is more likely we would reduce merit decisions
only in those cases in which the need for immediate review is
questionable. And if some cases worthy of early appellate intervention
do not receive it, that is a price worth paying in exchange for the clarity
we would gain in avoiding the uncertainties associated with
Rule 54(b).349
3. Executing on the Judgment
Perhaps lost in all the debate about appealability of partial final
judgments is the practical consideration that a Rule 54(b) judgment
346. See, e.g., CLERMONT, supra note 17, § 2.6, at 148–49.
347. See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 171, 175–77; see also Michael E. Solimine,
Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1201–
03 (1990) (suggesting that appellate courts should defer to district courts’ decisions to certify
under § 1292(b) or at least should explain why they reject certifications).
348. See CLERMONT, supra note 17, § 2.6, at 149.
349. But see id, § 2.6, at 149 (noting that “whoever determines appealability might be
wrong occasionally” but that exercising appellate jurisdiction is more efficient than
“expend[ing] energy on second-guessing decisions granting appeals”).
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becomes enforceable upon its entry350 unless execution is stayed.
Eliminating Rule 54(b), and relying instead on a procedure akin to
§ 1292(b), would mean that the orders in question would no longer be
final at the time they are dispatched for appeal.
As a practical matter, the elimination of Rule 54(b) would have an
adverse impact only on the execution of money judgments. District
courts are empowered already to issue injunctive relief before final
judgment,351 and my proposal would not affect that power. So the real
concern is that the delay in entering final judgment might compromise a
prevailing party’s ability to obtain monetary satisfaction.352
But that concern is not enough to overcome the steep problems that
Rule 54(b) poses. Litigation against financially unstable defendants
always involves the risk of insolvency, and even under Rule 54(b) there
is a risk of asset dissipation before the district court adjudicates a
claim.353 More importantly, these concerns are better addressed in
appropriate cases—both before and after liability is established—by
prejudgment attachment procedures to ensure that wrongdoers do not
dissipate their assets.354
Ultimately, the uncertainty that plagues Rule 54(b) certifications
calls into question the propriety of permitting a victor to execute on a
Rule 54(b) money judgment. After all, if the Rule 54(b) certification
turns out to be improper, then the judgment is not final for purposes of
execution any more than it is final for purposes of appeal. But litigants
would have no way to know about the defective judgment until the
appellate court rejects the appeal. Meanwhile, execution proceedings
may have begun.355 Eliminating the risk of premature execution is itself
a reason to embrace a proposal that eliminates Rule 54(b).

350. E.g., Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 220 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012).
351. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
352. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1980) (finding that
concerns about the ability to execute on a delayed judgment are appropriate considerations in
entering immediate judgment under Rule 54(b)).
353. See, e.g., Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Renewed: Preliminary Injunctions to Secure
Potential Money Judgments, 67 WASH. L. REV. 257, 267–68 (1992).
354. See, e.g., id. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has limited the use of preliminary
injunctions to prevent asset dissipation. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance
Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999). But the decision in Grupo Mexicano recognizes that
Congress has the power to override the Court’s holding in that case. See id. at 322. And the
holding does not apply to assets on which the plaintiff can assert an equitable lien. See, e.g.,
Iantosca v. Step Plan Servs., Inc., 604 F.3d 24, 33–34 (1st Cir. 2010).
355. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a) (execution proceedings on a judgment may begin when “14
days have passed after its entry”).
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4. Administrative Burdens
Finally, my proposal will add an additional step to the appeal
process—the petition to the appellate court to appeal from a certified
order.356 Under the current system, an appellant simply files a notice of
appeal, as she would do from any other final order. But the
discretionary process involves briefing on the question whether to
permit immediate review.
This is not troubling. We already accommodate discretionary-appeal
petitions under § 1292(b) and in connection with other rights of
discretionary review.357 And Rule 54(b) already requires appellate
courts to grapple with jurisdictional issues. The petition procedure
simply requires them to do so earlier in the process, before the parties
expend time and resources briefing and preparing the case for oral
argument. Hastening the jurisdictional skirmish will lead to greater
efficiency, not less.358
CONCLUSION
For seventy-five years, we have struggled to apply a rule that was
designed for a purpose no currently practicing lawyer can even
remember: to soften the impact of the 1938 expansion of civil litigation.
The various iterations of the rule have never managed to solve its
fundamental problems, and the Supreme Court’s occasional foray into
the Rule 54(b) dialog has succeeded only in aggravating the confusion.
A close examination of Rule 54(b) and its problems reveals that it is
not worth all the trouble—not when a simpler, all-discretionary vehicle
for early appeals is already functioning. Converting to a § 1292(b)-style
discretionary review avoids all the interpretive problems and procedural
traps that plague Rule 54(b) while still affording opportunities for early
review in cases that warrant it. The benefits of an all-discretionary
system far outweigh its burdens.
It is true that eliminating Rule 54(b) would reallocate power. It
would vest appellate courts with ultimate authority to decide whether to
hear the kinds of early appeals that now qualify for partial final
judgment, rather than leave those decisions to trial judges. But trial
judges would still enjoy the power to withhold certification. In the end,
then, the shared discretion would supplant a system in which the power
dynamics have led to inconsistent and confusing results.
356. See FED. R. APP. P. 5(a).
357. See supra note 28.
358. See Akers v. Alvey, 338 F.3d 491, 495–96 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that inadequate
Rule 54(b) findings that came to light after full briefing weighed in favor of disposing of the
appeal on the merits, and “if the jurisdictional issue had been spotted sooner, [the court] would
likely have remanded the case”).

2013]

CIVIL RULE 54(B): SEVENTY-FIVE AND READY FOR RETIREMENT

767

My proposal, for example, would have entirely avoided the
jurisdictional harangue that popped up at the last minute in Planned
Parenthood’s appeal to the Sixth Circuit.359 The parties would have
known, before briefing the appeal and certainly before oral argument,
whether the court would rule on the merits. Given the important
constitutional issues at stake, the court would quite likely have taken the
case. And instead of arguing about appellate jurisdiction at the last
minute, the parties to that appeal could have devoted all of their
resources to those important constitutional issues.

359. See supra text accompanying notes 1–5.

